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Abstract
After decades of optimistic theories of development, increasing global poverty and 
inequities remain at troublingly high levels. By the close of the twentieth century the 
development enterprise was accused of having “…reached an impasse, trapped within its 
own meta-narratives and unable to capture the diversity of the third world in any relevant 
and constructive manner” (Abrahamsen, 2000: ix). Similar observations have been made 
by Binns and Nel, (1999), McMichael (1996), Rivero (2001) and Rihani (2002) among 
others. These observations raise fundamental suspicions on the traditional approaches to 
development. The emerging consensus tends to favor bottom up approaches to 
development, anticipating that these might be better equipped to address 
underdevelopment. Thus the concepts of democratization and decentralization feature 
centrally in the prevailing literature. 
Literature seems to suggest that these emergent discourses have absorbed assumptions 
and contradictions. This in turn has rendered these discourses potentially deficient of 
meaningful impact. The specific task of this dissertation is to investigate participation 
issues in integrated planning. This will be achieved through assessing small businesses 
related LED in eThekwini municipality.
Integrated Development Planning is a process through which South African 
municipalities prepare a strategic development plan, for a five year period. The Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) is a product of the integrated development planning process.  
The IDP is a principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all 
planning, budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality. Since the IDP 
involves participation of a number of stakeholders, it is crucial for the municipality to 
adopt an appropriate approach and also put in place appropriate structures to ensure 
effective participation. 
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Here are some principles on participation: 
• The elected council is the ultimate decision-making forum on IDPs. 
• The role of participatory democracy is to inform, negotiate and comment on those 
decisions, in the course of the planning/ decision-making process.
• Public participation has to be institutionalised in order to ensure that all residents 
of the country have an equal right to participate.” (Republic of South Africa, 
undated)
Cornwall (2006:63) has already expressed serious worries on the way participation has 
navigated the development industry. For its part, she argues, 
“…contemporary participation discourse represents a reflux of strikingly similar 
policies, sentiments and pronouncements from a barely-remembered colonial past. 
Alongside the significant continuities in discourse and practice that span the 
colonial and post-colonial eras, the genealogy of participation in development 
reveals discontinuities and dissonances, broken records and broken promises” 
Within Cornwall’s concerns, this research project sought to understand the degree in 
which tendencies of top down approaches might still thrive in South Africa’s Local 
Economic Development discourse in regards to small businesses, despite policy 
commitments to participatory planning and governance. The findings suggest an urgent 
need to revisit the conceptualization of participation mechanisms. They further suggest 
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The concept of participation looms large in development literature. Prevailing 
development discourses assert that development is only meaningful in so far as intended 
beneficiaries are centrally involved in their own development. For Cornwall (2006), 
while participation appeared ‘ring fenced’ with innovation in the 1990’s, its dominance in 
public policy stretches back, although scantly, to a long time. Infact, its systematic 
analysis can be traced from antique literature such as Lord Lugard’s book ‘the dual 
mandate in tropical Africa’ published in 1922 which “…sought to put into place 
institutions through which certain functions and powers were delegated to traditional 
leaders and institutions..” (Cornwall, 2006:66). These sorts of articulations trace the entry 
of participation in the evolution of governance. 
Increasing the contemporary dominance of participation, Delgado et al.(2004) talk of 
‘indigenous knowledge for endogenous development’; UNESCO (2005) writes on 
‘knowledge societies’; for Lusthaus et al. (1999) solutions lie in ‘capacity development’.
More succinctly, Nel (2001:2) argues in favor of development founded on “…self-
reliance, local-coping, endogenous or bottom- up development and LED [Local 
Economic Development]…”. No wonder Cornwall (2006:62) finds that currently “… 
[p]participation has gained the status of development orthodoxy. With promises of giving 
‘the poor’ a voice and a choice, it has become something to which no one could possibly 
be opposed, an essential ingredient in getting development interventions and policies 
right”.
Alongside the emergence of the case for participatory development there has also been 
the emergence of a focus within some development contexts on Local Economic 
Development (LED). Authoritative bodies such as the United Nations cite LED as a 
useful tool which “ …seeks to stimulate inclusive growth in a participatory process in 
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which local people from all sectors work together to increase local commercial activities, 
resulting in a resilient and sustainable economy” (United Nations 2009:2).
In its current form, LED approaches development from strategic planning perspective 
including both territorial and integrated approaches –which is a deviation from the 
traditional sectoral approach (United Nations, 2009).   The territorial and integrated 
approach is a direct result of ‘downsizing’ the role of the state in development (see 
Helmsing, 2001). Although different concepts that illustrate ‘local development’ are 
varied across the developing world, they capture ‘territorial and integrated’ themes, thus 
fitting them accurately into Local Economic Development. LED in South Africa 
continues to register growing influence (see Hindson and Vicente, 2005, Helmsing, 2001) 
even if more in theory than practice. This is to the extent that national LED debates [such 
as ‘pro-poor’ and ‘pro-market’ LED discussions] are increasingly informing global
debates around LED.   
The underlying assumption in the participation and accountability ‘boom’ is that 
engaging of all stakeholders in processes of development is likely to create desirable and 
sustainable outcomes. Thus Twiggs (2001:6) contends that, “…participatory initiatives 
are likely to be sustainable because they build on local capacity, the participants have 
‘ownership’ of them, and they are more likely to be compatible with long-term 
development plans”.
Countries that have undergone stages of institutionalized discrimination might be more 
concerned about participation largely on human rights grounds [rather than development 
per se]. This is not to say human rights and development are separate goals, but rather 
that the implications of this participation on income levels might not be conceptualized as 
a core function of participation. For example, in South Africa’s case, participation might 
be seen as an aggressive attempt to correct history, as implied by Friedman (2006). This 
is if we consider Lipmann’s view (2003), that apartheid traditionally defined 
development process as the exclusive duty of few appointed government officials. In the
post 1994 era, this approach has changed, and now development is generally understood 
as “…negotiation-often via community leaders-” and importantly “community 
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involvement is no longer optional” (Lipmann, 2003:56). In similar understanding, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) determines that; 
“…development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is 
about active involvement and growing empowerment. In taking this approach we 
are building on the many forums, peace structures and negotiations that our 
people are involved in throughout the land” (RSA
http://www.anc.org.za/rdp/rdp1.html. 17th November 2007).
As noted, both the RDP and Lipman’s assertions appear to treat participation as 
extending beyond political corridors. Hence Lipman talks of ‘community leaders’ and the 
RDP speaks of “…building on …forums…that our people are involved in throughout the 
land”. While loopholes are already detectable [considering that these ‘forums’ and 
‘community leaders’ are representatives of citizenry], the notion of participation of 
communities beyond political structures seems to fit accurately within the Local 
Economic Development discourse. For Helmsing (2001b), Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra 
(2005), Nel and John (2006), LED tends away from ‘political representatives to 
‘beneficiary representatives’ or in the best case scenarios all the beneficiaries and 
‘development suppliers’ alike.
The consolidation of ‘bottom up’ development arguments of the 1990’s coincided with 
South Africa’s independence. It is in this same decade that development impasse (see 
Binns and Nel, 1999, McMichael 1996, Rivero 2001 and Rihani 2002), collided with the 
participation evolution. All factors equal, it is expected that South Africa’s re-birth in the 
‘participation decade’ was the best setting for thorough going participation. But as Morris 
and Robbins (2006) point out, important [development] institutions such as the 
Department of Trade and Industry still function as models of centralized institutions. 
Heller (2000), citing tensions in regards to HIV/AIDS in South Africa notes that the 
government has tended to slide towards ‘service delivery’ as an ideology, the result being 
poor public participation in HIV/AIDS processes. Lipman (2003) cites strong 
technocratic influence, in the beginning of the construction of the new Africa Centre 
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building. It is argued by the authors that the results of these initiatives have not been 
desirable. 
Interestingly, in theory South Africa has embraced the discourses of democratization and 
decentralization anticipating that these are potentially effective tools for addressing 
poverty and unemployment. Freund for example notes that all municipalities see their 
task as provision of “…equal opportunities…and sustainable growth” (2005:303) as a 
way of reinforcing decentralization and democratization. These discourses have further 
been embedded in a strategic document, namely, the Integrated Development Plan [IDP]
which seeks to maintain strong focus on outcomes of development initiatives [see Buffalo 
City, Municipality; 2005]. Atkinson (2003:119) thus notes that the IDP, as a 
constitutional requirement for all South African municipalities, seeks to be, inter alia, 
“…customer oriented…” as well as “…have a strong emphasis on performance…” 
Inspite of the LED rhetoric, suspecting that these are theories which have failed to 
actualize, Kesper and Rajaratnam (2003) are concerned that small businesses in South 
Africa have not fared well. Morris and Robbins (2006) envisage the problem of the poor 
performance to power centralization. This poor performance is inspite of a national 
strategy for small businesses, with its vision of “…involvement of government at all 
levels as well as private institutions and donor agencies in the development of South 
Africa’s small, micro- and medium-sized enterprises” (Kesper and Rajaratnam, 2003:2). 
By close of the first decade of the country’s democracy, Kesper and Rajaratnam (2003:3)
note, promotion of small businesses “…have not been able to turn the previously 
neglected small firm economy into a vibrant sector” partly as a result of from poorly 
coordinated policy implementation (Kesper and Rajaratnam, 2003). 
However, the responsibility does not entirely fall on the government. Internal constraints 
such as the complacency among Small and Medium and Micro enterprises (SMMEs) to 
measure up to global competition, or the distortion in capital and other factor markets 
have been identified as impediments to small enterprise growth (cf. Manning, 1996, 
Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999; Chandra et al., 2001). Importantly, more than one factor 
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could be blamed for the dismal performance, particularly [as Kesper and Rajaratnam 
(2003:2) argue] given that this network of factors has “…not yet been fully 
disentangled”.  
As already noted, this project limits itself to activities in the eThekwini municipality. 
Municipalities in South Africa are grouped into three categories; metropolitan 
municipalities, local municipalities and district municipalities, dubbed categories A B and 
C respectively (South Africa Year Book, 2005/06:349). As at 2007, Countrywide there 
are six category A municipalities, two hundred and thirty one category B municipalities 
and forty seven category C municipalities (ibid). The six metropolitan municipalities are 
eThekwini, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela. The 
constitution vests metropolitan councils with executive and legislative authorities, 
permitting them to “…decentralize powers and functions...” as they please (ibid). 
Narrowing to the specific interest of this study, eThekwini Municipality covers a 
geographic area of 2297 square kilometers (1.4% of the total provincial geographic 
landscape). It is situated along the eastern coast line of KwaZulu Natal [KZN] 
(eThekwini Municipality; 2003). EThekwini Municipal Area (EMA) population consists 
of approximately one third of the total KZN population, [about three million residents] 
which controls 60% of the province’s economic activity (ibid). According to the 2004 
Reviewed Integrated Plan (eThekwini Municipality; 2004), over 80% of the 
municipality’s population live in urban areas, while “…only 35% of the EMA area is 
predominantly urban in character…”. This data suggests that the urban centers in 
eThekwini are densely populated, with Durban carrying majority of the population 
relative to other urban centers. Hence, the municipality is determined to “…strategically 
turn Durban into a globally competitive and attractive city” (eThekwini Municipality; 
2003). 
In terms of employment levels, the quality of life survey 2002-2003 reports that by the 
year 2003, 42% of households in EMA earned R1500 or less, 38% earned between 
R1501 and R6000, 12% earned between R6001 and R12,000 while 9.3% earned over 
12,000 (eThekwini municipality, 2002-3:2). This pattern reflects high gaps of inequality 
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which the municipality and other development institutions attempt to address in their 
LED programmes.  
Against the above background, this dissertation will examine the intersections between 
integrated and territorial development and participation. The study will not only consider 
these concepts but also their application in a particular place – namely eThekwini.  The 
reasons for this interrogation lie in the arguments made by authors such as Hindson and 
Vicente (2005), Cornwall (2006), that the otherwise noble intentions of LED, as well as 
participation have been hijacked by contradicting currents, in turn recycling past 
weaknesses of development. On this platform of concerns, the research will try and 
understand the dynamics that might enable or disable different forms of interconnections 
between processes of participation and processes of LED (with a focus on small business 
development).
Chapter two will review existing literature on the subject of democratization and LED. 
This will involve drawing attention to the global discourses of governance and State 
reform yet fixing these in local discourses around LED and participation. This will then 
set stage for chapter three which begins to explain the methodology used in collecting 
primary data for this project, before these findings are presented in chapter four. Chapter 
five links the findings with the literature reviewed in chapter two before presenting the 
recommendations, while chapter six sums up the dissertation.  
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1.1. ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY’S COMMITMENT TO
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING.
The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) explains that “every new 
council that comes into office after the local government elections has to prepare its own 
IDP which will guide them for the five years that they are in office. The IDP is therefore 
linked to the term of office of councillors. The new council has the option either to adopt 
the IDP of its predecessor should it feel appropriate to do so or develop a new IDP taking
into consideration already existing planning documents” (Department of Provincial and 
Local Government (undated: 19).
As part of addressing the socio-economic needs of the public, eThekwini municipality 
has formulated the Long Term Development Framework (LTDF) document which aims 
to implement decentralization of ‘powers and functions’, within intervals of 20 years 
from July 2001 (eThekwini Municipality, 2001). The document argues that the 
municipality has established “the foundation for a new democratic and developmental 
local government …a local government that is responsive to peoples’ social and 
economic needs, and is transparent and accountable” (2001:2). The LTDF further 
underlines the municipality’s critical development challenges as: creation of economic 
growth, jobs and income, meeting of basic needs, alleviating of poverty, human capital 
development, management of the HIV pandemic, environmental security and 
sustainability (2001:5-7). The LTDF is further sub divided into five year plans, called 
Integrated Development Plan[s]. The IDP aims to address short term objectives while the 
LTDF focuses on Long term ones. 
.
While the above is the case, Ballard et al. (2007) are critical of the formulation of 
eThekwini LTDF. They argue that the beginning of the municipality’s LTDF strategy 
formulation in 1999 was what they call ‘internal and technical basis’. This first version 
faced serious challenges including lack of support and failed delivery of its intended 
‘development’ agenda. In 2000 a revised version with participation as a mainstream 
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theme was initiated (See Ballard et al., 2007). Ballard et al.(2007) attribute the 
participation mainstreaming to the then new city manager (Felix Dlamini) and 
transformation manager at the time (Sbu Sithole). 
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CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNANCE, STATE REFORM, 
PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
After decades of optimistic theories of development, increasing global poverty and 
inequities remain at troublingly high levels. By the close of the twentieth century the 
development enterprise was accused of having “…reached an impasse, trapped within its 
own meta-narratives and unable to capture the diversity of the third world in any relevant 
and constructive manner” (Abrahamsen, 2000: ix). Similar observations have been made 
by Binns and Nel, (1999), McMichael (1996), Rivero (2001) and Rihani (2002) among 
others. These observations fundamentally suspect the traditional approaches to 
development as inadequate. Possible solutions are seen to exist in bottom up approaches 
to development, anticipating that these might be better equipped. Many of these 
approaches highlight concepts of democratization and decentralization. A good deal of 
time has however passed since these discourses first appeared, yet high levels of poverty 
and inequality still persist. A review of existing literature might suggest that these well
meaning discourses are potentially, either self contradictory or presumptive. 
The chronology of the chapter is as follows. First it outlines key terms. Second, it 
presents theoretical material upon which this project builds. Third will be coverage of 
literature on the state and the shift to decentralization, before turning to the emergence of 
participation and accountability in development discourses in section four. The chapter 
will illustrate the case of integrated development planning in South Africa in section five. 
The role of section six will be to ‘make connections’ through exploration of notions of 
participation and accountability in approaches to LED globally and in South Africa.
Amidst the aforementioned parameters, the project will sharpen focus to small 
businesses, from the view that small businesses are increasingly being viewed as critical 
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job creation and poverty reduction machines (See Republic of South Africa (undated), , 
Kesper and Rajaratnam, 2003). 
2.1. EXPLORATION OF TERMINOLOGIES. 
2.1.1 Local Economic Development
LED is understood as the joint venture between local stakeholders which embraces 
partnerships in formulation and implementation of strategies with the aim of utilizing 
local resources for job creation and economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra 
2005, Nel and John, 2006). Part of its central building blocks are community 
participation; businesses development and locality development (see Helmsing, 2001b). 
2.1.2 Participation and Accountability 
In this study, participation will be used to mean involvement of all stakeholders in 
producing information, and/or data, and the possibility to translate this data into policy 
tool (Sidorenko, 2006). Participation is either institutionalized or voluntary. 
The term accountability will be used to mean  “…relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain or justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgment and the actor may face consequences” 
(Bovens, 2006:9). 
This author argues, in line with the views of the Municipal Act (see DPLG; 2009) and
authors such as Cornwall (2006), as well as Ballard et al. (2007); that participation and 
accountability need to be a deliberate process, which should go beyond bureaucratic 
corridors and official representative structures as democracy matures.
2.1.3 Small Businesses
The South African convention suggests that small businesses are generally those 
consisting 50 employees or less. EThekwini municipality, however, does not use a strict 
definition. 
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2.1.4 Integrated Development Plan 
Integrated Development Plan’s (IDPs) are South Africa’s local government strategic 
programmes, which mandate municipalities to direct and coordinate, “…activities of an 
elected municipal authority” (Harrison, 2006:186), with the objective of delivering 
sustainable development through community participation (Republic of South Africa,
2007). Their goal is to eradicate “…the legacy of the past…promoting social equality, 
creation of wealth, fighting poverty and enabling inter and intra governmental co-
operation” (Cape town Municipality, 2003/2004).  
2.1.5 Outcome Based Planning 
Outcome based planning in this study will mean a deliberate participatory process in 
which acceptable and sustainable development outcomes are produced. This emphasis 
forms the core of the IDP strategic document. The ‘outcome based’ concept emphasises 
outcome indicators that are relevant, temporal, available, comparable and understandable 
and shared by all stakeholders1 (Republic of New Zealand, 2003)  
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Common trends in urban places conclusively reflect universal forces that function in 
these contexts. In attempting to explain urban patterns in South Africa, Freund and 
Padayachee (2002) have argued that urban centers are characterized by both development 
and underdevelopment, essentially shaped by what they refer to as “deeper currents” and 
“profound social and cultural trends”. More precisely, Beall et al. (2002) argues that 
South African Cities are characterized by income inequalities, as well as 
‘cosmopolitanism’ with immigrants into the city retaining rural and small town links, and 
governance. This view underlines the importance of social and spatial links that form the 
character of cities.  
  
1 Outcome indicators should reflect on local community values [relevant],  “highlight trends over time and 
show progress toward goals” [temporal], compare with data from other countries, [comparable], their data 
should be  easily accessible [available], and easily understood by all stakeholders [understandable]  
(Guidance on outcome focused management, 2003:4. http://io.ssc.govt.nz. 23/02/07).
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These frictions build upon two dominant theories of human behavior. And while issues 
might not fall squarely in these theories, the development and underdevelopment 
‘hostilities’ in part find their space in them.  On one hand there is urban ecology and on 
the other, what Hall and Robbins (2002) refer to as urban regime theory –generally 
known as the urban political economy (also see Kleniewski 1997). 
Initially conceptualized by Tonnies, Durkheim and Simmel, the urban ecology theory 
understands urban centers as reflecting naturalized social ties among urban dwellers, who 
are bound by what he sees as social and occupational differences propped up with 
regulations and public perceptions (Kleniewski, 1997). The dominant idea is that of 
agglomeration of diverse social groups, linked together by different factors such as 
income levels, occupation interests, age, race, and the like. This theory appears to group 
citizens into classes. But while this might be a fairly reasonable way of understanding 
urban centers it highlights the problem rather than the solution to problems of 
underdevelopment. It however tries to open a debate which anticipates solutions to 
evolve from this premise. 
The second theory (urban regime theory) views cities as constituting categorization of 
organizations and interests, often operating within frictions between social classes (Hall 
and Robbins, 2002). Building up further from this concept, Hall and Robbins argue that 
local development initiatives tend to be dominated by local elitists who drive socio-
economic processes undemocratically, resulting to skewed allocation of resources. 
Kleniewski (1997) argues along the same vein. It might be added that interest groups tend 
to flourish in bureaucratic systems. Thus various authors agree that  local elites and 
public officials tend to play down their accountability to the public, in addition to 
dominating bureaucratic processes with vague, abbreviated, questionable measurement 
proxies; all embedded in what Murthy (2003) calls ‘methodological sophistication 
thinking’ (See also Wise, 2003). Realistically, the idea of doing away with bureaucracies 
is inconceivable. Rather, as Hall and Robbins contend, when bureaucracies run 
efficiently, they are likely to avert risks and uncertainties. 
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The urban regime theory approach appears more relevant in contexts which rely on 
governance and power (whether economic or political) for development. Along this vein 
Truong’s (2006) finds that “…human lives cannot be disconnected from the institutions 
in which they are embedded” (Truong, 2006:3). Further evidence suggests high levels of 
mobility within classes depending on increasing levels of ‘eliteness’. What is observable 
is that as people become powerful either through education or even through political 
power, they tend to take charge of processes and content of public policies, often pulling 
these into their favor. Given the context of this study – a city in a developing country-, 
this study prefers to use the regime theory. 
The section that follows begins by tracing bureaucratic practices on a national level. This 
will involve traditional roles of the state and how these are changing with changing times. 
This understanding will help to enlighten contemporary behaviors of state bureaucracy
and how this behavior relates to issues of participation and accountability.   
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2.3. THE STATE AND THE SHIFT TO DECENTRALIZATION
2.3.1 Definition Issues
A definition of the state would be a good beginning in the quest to understand its 
dynamics. Poggi’s definition (1990:19) in this regard enlightens that the state is “…an 
organization which controls the population occupying a definite territory…”. He further 
observes that the state is different from other organizations in that it is autonomous and 
centralized (ibid). Unfortunately Poggi’s view seems to assume that the divisions of the 
state are accurately coordinated with each other. In practice this remains a major 
challenge. Hobbes and Rousseau form a foundation upon which Poggi makes his case. 
These theorists argued that ‘social contract’ was a critical component of the state (Morris, 
1998:7). 
Morris (1998) further draws attention to the dominance of territory by the state, which 
provides the state with the potential to achieve its highest ambitions (see also King and 
Kendall, 2004:1). In sum, all these authors suggest central characteristics of the state as; 
(a) territorial dominance, (b) social contract with populace and (c) monopoly of resources 
for achieving its highest ambitions. 
Monopoly of resources by the state warrants further attention. It implies state control of 
policy tools, of financial resources, as well political power to implement its interests. 
These levers could be used for improvement of the public or alienation of their 
livelihoods -although developing countries narrate a dark story on negative impacts of 
monopoly of power (see Morris, 1998). Morris cites public evils generated by the state 
such as the great depression and catastrophic wars. For King and Kendall (2004) there are 
better stories of power monopoly, such as “…protecting individuals from dangers” which 
the state could leverage through responsible use of power, policy and resources. 
Provision of education and health also join the list of potential ‘public goods’. 
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2.3.2. Quest for a different role of the State?
While it seems that traditionally the state is a critical institution for the well being of its 
citizens, the commission of fundamental public evils in history attracts doubts on its 
legitimacy. However, despite major public evils such as wars and the great depression, 
these do not necessarily require a rejection of the potential for a legitimate contemporary 
state. Rather, minor public evils such as unnecessary regulation of markets by the state 
form the bedrock upon which reservations in regards to state interventions are founded. 
Literature does not propose absolute abolition of the nation state. However, current 
debates tilt the thinking that nation states might not be as useful as they were traditionally 
conceptualized. Along this wave of thought, they might need to relinquish power to more 
‘valuable’ bodies. Kendall and King (2004) suggest examples of these ‘valuable’ bodies 
as multinational corporations, supra national institutions and local institutions. Kendall 
and King (2004) observe that the presence of these institutions might reinforce the 
significance of the state given that nation states are central to decision making on each of 
these forces. An opposing view however suggests that these institutions are becoming 
increasingly powerful over the state such that they seem to be succeeding state monopoly 
of power, policy and financial resources.
Although Kendall and King’s argument (2004) introduces a unique dimension of viewing 
these three actors, empirical evidence, at least in Clarke and Gaile (1998), demonstrates
reasons for reservations. In reviewing Robert Reich’s The Work Of Nations, Clarke and 
Gaile reveal that the growth of America’s big corporations after the second World war 
(WWII) ‘hollowed out the state’ in a sense. They observe that in operating with less state 
regulation, the ‘national champions’ became increasingly successful and powerful, with 
support from American public, to the extent that public relations campaigns hailed them 
as “wonders of the free market system”. Clarke and Gaile argue that big corporations in 
America’s history have tended to co-opt the state such that, these corporations dominate 
policy processes in practice. 
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The withdrawal of the state is often viewed as an action which could either improve (See 
Kendall and King 2004, and Majumda and Mukherjee, 2007) or alienate (See Kashani, 
2005) how the state is viewed. The underlying concept is that social-political and 
economic stability as a public good could be arrived at through discreet action by the 
state. It is not surprising that the performance of the state is often measured in the way it 
has tended to address socio-economic and political issues within its sphere. Traditionally 
the power to coordinate social, political and economic dynamics has always resided 
within national levels of the state, as these have been the main trustees of political power. 
However, literature suggests that these traditions have begun to fade as globalization and 
localization erode the traditional role of the state (Clarke and Gaile, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Scott and Stopper, 2003; Marcou, Undated). 
Local spaces are becoming more powerful and critical in providing direction for 
development. Problematic as the role of nation state might be, ‘transition’ to local power 
might generate even further problems. Does governance and clear minded nation state 
suggest proportionate sub-national clarity? Does the shifting of power from national 
governments in favor of the devolution model possess any noble value? Are there 
dynamics in this shift, such that ‘downward movement of power’ led by supra national 
institutions differ from grass root generation of power? These are problems the following 
section will attend to. 
2.4. EMERGENCE OF PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES
Globally, patterns of development practice have undergone major shifts within a 
relatively short period. The recent decades in particular have seen increasing disapproval 
of traditional theories, which operated in top-down fashions, seeking to ‘civilize’ the 
developing world. The failures of these theories to explain underdevelopment saw 
development discourse grind into halt -otherwise called the development impasse (Booth, 
1985; Abrahamsen, 2000, Gemandze, undated). 
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Whether to rescue the ‘dying’ discourse or to offer feasible alternative, development has 
now taken a major shift, with people in the center. More precisely, a resounding 
emergence of participation around the globe continues to surge in global development. 
Thus terms such as governance and state reform are used to imply decentralization and 
democratization and loom large in modern development literature. But much remains to 
be done, to alter ‘path dependency’ patterns of the top-down fashions of development. 
This section grapples with issues that inform the quest for thorough-going participation 
and state reform. 
2.4.1. Participation within development spaces occupied by Nation 
States. 
Participation shores have shifted from abstract democratic practice to a development
practice. In this line of thought, Bowen (2007:65) argues that participation is now an 
“…integral element of economic improvement2 and social change efforts”. In similar 
language, Parrit (2004:1) underlines participation as “…one of the central influences in 
mainstream development thinking”. 
While participation spaces are broad and various, existing arguments seem to imply that 
participation has become a mainstream agenda within economic spaces that remain 
largely the domain of nation states. In this regard, by placing forward ‘government 
initiated advisory or policy –setting bodies’ as structures through which citizen 
participation might take place, Bowen (2007:66) seems to suggest that all nation states or 
systems of governance potentially provide participation platforms. They don’t. Going by 
Arnstein’s participation ladder (See Bowen, 2007; 66), ‘degrees of citizen power’ section 
of the ladder demonstrates a fully reformed state, ‘degrees of tokenism’ might suggest a 
reforming state, while ‘non- participation’ appears to suggest a non democratic state. 
  
2 Emphasis by the author of this work.
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 8        Degrees of citizen power
 7
 6
 5      
 4        Degrees of tokenism
 3
 2     
 1         Non participation
  
These ‘different types participation levels’ find easy parallels with ongoing debates 
around the role of nation states in economic development. It is in this context that 
treatment of ‘nation state’ in modern era systematically embeds participation or lack of it, 
as well as development or lack of it. With this in view, Peters and Pierre, (1998) identify 
three forms of the state. First is the benevolent state, which assumes the duty of providing 
public services such as functional legal system, support of stable macroeconomic 
environment; correction of market failures; provision of tax merit goods; and 
subsidization of growing industries. The second type is the public choice state, which 
originates from the view that politicians tend to ‘maximize their utility’ through either 
motivations of getting re-elected and/or maximization of incomes. The third form is the 
‘watchdog’ state, which is essentially authoritarian, yet it seeks to guard personal 
interests from both the state and the markets. The first reflects interventionist state, the 
second neo-liberal state, and the third referee3 state. These categorizations straddle 
through the ‘participation’ and ‘development’ debates. 
Leftwitch (1996) is even more explicit in detecting the collaborative tendencies of 
participation and development. He envisions (a) democratic non-developmental state, 
which allows public participation in social, political and economic processes, yet failing 
  










to deliver development. (b) Non-democratic non-developmental nation-state, which 
neither mainstreams public opinion, nor delivers development. (c) Non-democratic 
developmental state, which although authoritarian, it seeks to deliver development, and 
(d) democratic developmental state, which mainstreams public opinion and delivers 
development simultaneously. 
The aforementioned divisions of nation states fall within three broad theories of the 
nation state (See Gering et al., 2005:2-3), namely: (i) Decentralist state which supposes 
that good governance arises from the diffusion of power among multiple independent 
bodies (ii) The centralist state which presumes that good governance flows from 
institutions that centralize power in a single locus of sovereignty and (iii) democratic 
centralist state which combines both authority and public participation. As self evident, 
these theories of the state operate within participation and development discourses.  
The participation industry consolidated itself progressively with changing paradigms of 
development in the second half of the 20th century. The contradictions, ‘greyness’ and
practical failures of the African state to deliver development could only be resolved 
through shifts in the nature of nation states- so argued the World Bank. In this context of 
thought, decentralization was summoned as a universal model of ‘doing’ development
through ‘undoing’ or reforming the nation state, to harmonize it with meaningful and 
outcome based development practices. The subsection that follows will trace the origins 
and definitions of the decentralization concept. 
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2.4.2. Decentralization: Definitions, Contexts of Emergence and 
Accompanying Problems.
2.4.2.1 Definition of Decentralization
Globalization is largely responsible for the relative shifts in power away from nation 
states and towards both global institutions and local structures (See Nel and Rogerson 
2005). For these authors, globalization should (also) be viewed in light of recent power 
transfers, reflected in Yugoslavia and Soviet Union’s collapse on one hand and the 
emergence of new states in Europe, Asia and Africa (such as Macedonia, Uzbekistan and 
Eritrea) on the other. Emphasis has paid tribute to ‘technology’ and ‘mobility’ as the 
mainstream players, peripherizing practical examples such as stated by Nel and 
Rogerson.  
Going by Nel and Rogerson’s definition, decentralization is the “…deliberate and 
planned transfer of resources away from central state institutions to peripheral 
institutions” (2005:24). This definition might be misleading in that it would be incorrect 
to suggest that Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated on a deliberately planned
process, or that Eritrea, Macedonia and Uzbekistan emerged on a planned transfer of 
power. By indulging supra national institutions, the concept further alienates Nel and 
Fergusons ‘soft’ approach to it. This is given that these authors fail to make a distinction 
between planned and unplanned decentralization of power. The study now turns attention 
to the emergence and content of decentralization in the broader context of state reform. 
2.4.2.2. Context of the Emergence, and the Tenets, of Decentralization.    
Globally, development practice has undergone profound shifts within a relatively short 
period. While seen as a separate discourse, ‘governance’ is now presiding over 
development. Cases in point being that terms such as good governance (Kaufmann 2001),
state reform (Wong, 1991), glocalization (Glocal Forum, 2004) decentralization 
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(Muramatsu, 2001) and democratization (Whitehead, 2002) have found increasing space 
in development literature. 
The section that follows will track the route which the concept of ‘governance and state 
reform’ has followed. The section will also examine ideological underpinnings of 
governance and state reform.  
(i) Trajectories of a Contradictory Discourse
The concept of ‘governability’ first featured in classical political economy in the 1980s 
and was used to imply the need for a strong link between the rule of law and development 
(Johnson, 1997). The 1980s decade presided over the cold war era as well as its demise. 
It is inevitable that development discourses that emerged during this time were highly 
influenced by the dominant ideological schools, capitalism and communism. The ‘rule of 
law’ in the cold war context could only have meant different things to the different 
ideological camps. And to state the obvious, it would have been a sell out to alliance 
partners if capitalists adopted the perspectives of communists or vice versa. Clearly 
therefore, it was difficult period to define universal concepts as far as development was 
concerned.  
The end of the cold war provided a more even ground upon which concepts could claim 
universality. Along these lines Johnson (1997) sees the end of the cold war as coinciding 
with replacement of the term ‘governability’ with ‘governance’-the latter meaning 
restructuring of public administration in support of the development agenda. Given that, 
end of the cold war implied success of capitalism and failure of communism, within 
reason, the ‘new’ concept was a triumphant assertion of the capitalism ideology. The 
result of which the World Bank (WB) -a central player of the capitalism alliance- was 
amongst the first to use the term governance (see Abrahamsen, 2000). Seemingly in 
attempt to dispel misunderstanding of the concept, the WB interchangeably used 
democracy and good governance. The basis of these twin concepts was the understanding 
that sustainable development is only possible through political legitimacy. 
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The direct meaning attached to these concepts was “…creation and protection of property 
rights,…provision of a regulatory regime that works with the market to promote 
competition,…sound macroeconomic policies” as well as implementation of policies and  
“…institutions that may be unpopular among some,-or even a majority-of the population”
(Wilson, 2006:13). Ideological influence is clearly traceable if we go by Wilson’s 
definition. In lobbying for bigger consensus in this wave of thinking, Abrahamsen (2000) 
notes that the Bank mobilized donors to provide aid only to those countries which had 
followed reform programmes based on the good governance thinking.  Many developing 
countries had not been given opportunities to reflect on what option would be most 
suitable for them, and so, since they needed foreign aid, the only option available was to 
‘reform’.
Reform they had to. After all, Sub-Saharan Africa had recorded declining Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and fading benevolence of the state (See Abrahamsen, 2000).
Some countries such as South Africa during the pre-1990 decade advanced racism, 
clientilism as well as tribalism through the use of state bureaucracy (see Vale, 2003). The 
perceived misuse of state bureaucracy by African governments, argues Abrahamsen
(2000), earned African states the phrase ‘states without citizens4’. It was thus 
hypothesized that Africa continued to under-develop due to ‘poor governance’ (ibid) and 
as such needed to carry out state reform. 
Many states in sub-Saharan Africa opted to protect their relationships with foreign 
donors, at the expense of the populace- after all, many of them had not been 
democratically elected and thus were not accountable to the electorate. Protests and 
demonstrations against the reforms came a little bit too late, as local people took the heat 
of the impact examples being Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and cÔte d’Ivoire (Abrahamsen, 
2000). Social inequities had widened largely due to the reforms so much so, that in 1987 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB introduced in Ghana what they 
termed as Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) 
(Abrahamsen, 2000). 
  
4 Emphasis by the author of this study.
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What needs to be noted in the above context is not so much the possible ‘hidden agenda’ 
of the WB- for it is highly likely that the Bank genuinely believed in the success of 
reform policies. Rather, of greater interest is power interplay –where powerful actors 
influenced processes and outcomes, often at the expense of the less powerful. The good 
governance discourse, as implemented by many sub-Saharan Africa states under the WB 
reform agenda, clearly undermined nation states and the electorate, yet it was these very 
electorates who were expected to bear outcomes of policies. They had been denied the 
opportunity to shape a critical discourse that impacted so heavily on them. What deepens 
the debate is that failure of the reforms was seen as poor implementation of the reforms. 
The complexity that governed the reforms needs to be noted. The following sub section 
attempts to draw the picture on how these forces probably thrived. 
(ii) Role Players in Corridors of Power and Influence
Out of exchanges of global and local influences emerge theories and policies, which 
impact on how the state responds. Often institutions driving various apparatus exert 
pressure on the state, -and sometimes exhaust the state, - as the state seeks to respond to 
these pressures. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the interface of actors in discourse 
formation5.  Importantly, in a globalization era global force often overwhelms local 
forces, in the end supra national agenda is likely to prevail over the local agenda.  
Of further attention is that definitions of governance and reform are founded on what the 
state should do on the one hand, on the other what it should not do (see for example 
Stiglitz, 2004, Bockstette et al., 2002, Clarke and Gaile, 1998, King and Kendall, 2004). 
Stated differently, the state is the main subject of debate in governance and reform. This 
inference falls almost accurately into state versus market debate which is mainly 
advanced by two ideological camps, - state fundamentalists (see Takehiko, 2001) and 
market fundamentalists (Prechel, 2006).
  
5 Original conceptualization by the author of this work
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 Theories and policy proposals that 
 emerge from exchanges of processes
  
Local Context                         The State Institution  International Context
 Undercurrent exchanges of processes 
  between the state, local and international contexts.
Figure 1.1
Shifting the argument away from the state, and placing the public in the centre, Berg-
Schlosser and Kersting (2003) observe five forms of public participation. They present 
what they term as type I participation, referring to non-participation by particular group 
of the population. Type II consists of those who do not get involved in any part of 
participation process apart from the voting. Type III are party oriented, -those who get 
involved in campaigns, and other regular party activities, type IV are the ‘unconventional 
participants’ who use extra-legal measures such as violent protests to participate. And 
type V are those whose methods cut across type I to type IV. 
37
While these behaviours are determined by social and cultural factors, some of which 
include age, education, income levels, among others (Berg-Schlosser and Kersting
(2003), it is clear that these categorizations treat the participation options availed by the 
state as critical. But Wilson and Perret have cautioned against participation patterns, 
which “…often translate into mere dissemination or consensus building around pre-
determined outcomes…” (In Berry and Mollard, 2008). 
Wilson and Perret’s caution places more weight on free participation of citizens on policy 
processes; after all, as already illustrated, it is highly likely that citizens will react against 
non participatory patterns. Nation states continue to grapple with the governance 
question. For South Africa, the transformation is even more complex and probably too 
risky. Below the study explores this complexity. 
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2.5. INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN SOUTH 
AFRICA
The difficult birth of post Apartheid South Africa presented policy makers with hard 
questions and contradictions. This wasn’t the case of solutions in search for problems, but 
deep rooted social and economic challenges that required innovative ‘solutions’. Unlike 
many African countries, Gueli et al. (undated) posit that the South Africa’s
“…transition from conflict to peace during the 1990s was marked by unrivalled 
levels of political and social reconciliation; and, during this critical time, 
government institutions were quickly transformed to promote ‘true’ development 
and democracy”
These authors relate Integrated Development Planning (IDP) to these sorts of 
‘reconciliations’. IDP setting might be, however, more ‘older’ than the social and 
political reconciliation. The ‘separate development’ project of the Apartheid regime 
inevitably yielded serious and systematic political, social, and economic deficits among 
the non white communities. This necessitated a planning process which involved ordinary 
South Africans in development planning and the accruing benefits. No wonder the apex 
of the IDP process is participation of all the relevant stakeholders (see Department of 
Provincial and Local Government, undated)
2.5.1 Historical Platform for Integrated Development Planning In 
South Africa
South Africa’s pre-1994 development trajectory was largely characterized by what Lewin 
(1999) refers to as ‘economics of discrimination’, regulated by a centralist state. In terms 
of economic growth, McCord (2003:42) notes that in general, South Africa’s “economic 
performance deteriorated significantly from the mid 1970’s with average growth rates 
slowing to 2.9% between 1975 and 1981 and 1.1% between 1982 and 1988”. McCord 
further notes that formal sector employment and inflation worsened during this period, 
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with the economy losing capacity to absorb new market labor entrants. A combination of 
internal political conflict and lack of investor confidence undermined the South African 
economy, McCord argues (see ibid). 
The result of these currents was that, as at 2003, according to South Africa’s Human 
Development Report (Adelzadeh and Ohiorhenuan; 2003;5) over 48.5% (19.5 Million) 
South Africans fell below poverty level. The Human Development Index (HDI) measured 
at 0.67 in 2003 while gini-coefficient measured at 0.635 in 2001 (ibid). By the same year, 
the country was characterized by “…weak access to basic services by the poor, 
unemployment and underemployment, low economic growth rates and the weakening 
employment generation capacity of current growth path, environmental degradation, 
HIV/AIDS and inadequate social security system” (ibid:6). The World Fact Book records 
South Africa’s current official unemployment at 25% while the unofficial unemployment 
stands at 40%, with 30% of the entire population living below one dollar a day (Central 
Intelligence Agency; 2007 https://www.cia.gov. 31st October 2007).
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Republic of South Africa 
http://www.anc.org.za/rdp 31st October 2007) recognizes that apartheid left the working 
class poorly equipped for changes in the global economy, underdeveloped small and 
medium sized enterprises, highly protected industries, and, under investment in research, 
development and training. Inefficiencies of national logistical framework, shortage of 
suitably skilled labor, discriminative spatial patterns on labor, stringent measures to entry 
into value and commodity chains by businesses, limited new investment opportunities, 
deficiencies in state capacity to deliver and manage development, are some of legacies of 
apartheid visible in South Africa’s economy (Republic of South Africa;2007).
With the profound underdevelopment forces outlined above, it was critical that South 
Africa’s post apartheid development chapter open with a pro-poor policy framework, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Unlike in many African countries, 
this was as developmental as it was participatory (see Kambuwa and Wallis, 2002). 
Inevitably, any successful recovery of the negative impacts of this ‘separate 
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development’ project required an innovative service delivery model. This vein of 
thinking is the very foundation of the IDP. 
The RDP possessed an elevated view of the public sector, and its ability to deliver public 
services efficiently and effectively. Accordingly, the RDP focused sharply on the ‘local’ 
space. This is considering Kambuwa and Wallis (undated) view, that the RDP’s expected
local authorities to facilitate performance management approach in delivery of services to 
meet basic needs.  
Operating within the constitutional mandate and the RDP expectation, the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) developed a “…process through which 
municipalities prepare a strategic development plan, for a five year period. The Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) is a product of the integrated development planning process. 
The IDP is a principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all 
planning, budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality (see 
Department of Provincial and Local Government; undated). The Municipal Systems ACT 
of 2000 requires that all Municipalities undertake an Integrated Development Planning to
produce Integrated Development Plans (ibid).
2.5.2. Participation in the Gear ‘Regime’ and Related Implications. 
The shift from the RDP policy to the macroeconomic oriented programme in 1998, -the 
Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy was by many accounts a 
decisive point in South Africa’s ‘economic governance’ agenda. Not only was the shift an 
economic one, but also a governance one. The nature of the ‘new’ state was centralization 
of decision making power.  Of course a necessary move given the obsession with 
‘economic growth’ (see Republic of South Africa, undated). In the GEAR policy 
document, the term growth appears 94 times in 25 pages (on average four times per page) 
while the term participation only appears three times in 25 pages (once in every 30 
pages). The policy shift from RDP to GEAR necessarily toned down commitment to 
Integrated Development Planning. 
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Practically, macro stability and broad based participation might not co-exist without 
frictions. Not surprising therefore, a fairly significant percentage of South Africa’s 
population still live in informal settlements, in spite of the government’s efforts to deliver 
housing. The business newspaper, posted in the government’s website on April 20th 2007 
cited that housing backlog stood at 2.4 million housing regardless of the delivery pace, 
which is currently 250, 000 a year (Republic of South Africa; 2007)
In some respects, there are some parallels (however subtle) between the apartheid state 
and the ‘GEAR State’ namely, the regime theory appears to have been the overarching 
model in these two regimes. The state was a powerful actor, often at the expense of broad 
based participation. There is a high likelihood that an Integrated Development Planning 
can only work effectively in a participatory state model.  
But even in a less-democratic national control of development process, and although 
these tendencies might undermine participatory development, state space might simply be 
an avenue through which global or local actors can exert influence on policy. In this 
regard, in a post GEAR era, South Africa is caught between international pressures as 
well as global discourses such as decentralization and local development challenges. For 
Freund (2006) there is a ‘central goal’ of the current government, that is, recovery of 
black people’s dignity, and, what he terms as secondary goals, that is, racial and gender 
equity as well as  poverty alleviation. By implication, redistribution is a ‘need’ and not 
just a good policy idea. If economic growth is an indispensable goal for the GEAR 
regime, redistribution of wealth is equally inevitable from the citizens view point. 
In the short term, these are likely to be contradictory as far as social stability is 
concerned. The poor population, supported by civil society appears to demand greater 
influence on policy content, while economic logic dictates that redistribution must be 
bundled with economic growth if both are to maintain sustainability. The state must 
balance these tensions. Both the rich and the poor as Bhorat and Kanbur (2006:13) argue,
interpret democracy as the ability of the state to deliver development to its citizens. But 
their concept of development might mean different things to different classes of citizens. 
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For example, business owners might consider development as facilitation of business 
environment by government, while the poor might view development in terms of 
government’s provision of basic services and job creation. To reconcile different 
interpretations of development by the different classes in South Africa will be the 
challenge that the state will have to grapple with at least for the foreseeable future.  
The RDP does not solve the conceptual rifts between the two main camps. Although  the 
document underlines participation as a necessary process to development by arguing that 
“…the birth of a transformed nation can only succeed if the people themselves are 
voluntary6 participants in the process towards the realization of these goals they have 
themselves helped to define” (Republic of South Africa. RDP, 1994:7), it makes a 
fundamental assumption. It fails to recognize that if citizens are invited to be voluntary 
participants, representations of various classes in policy processes are likely to be uneven.  
And, GEAR has certainly not attempted to address this ‘balance issue’ adequately. Infact, 
the second order policy programme (GEAR) undermines participation to some extent.
Jager (2006) argues that the post apartheid state (implicitly referring to the GEAR ‘state’) 
has adopted two forms of governance in its response to prevailing development 
challenges. First is what he calls institutional centralization, or the centralization of 
presidential powers. The other is what he dubs dispositional centralization, which refers 
to the imposition of development duties to the civil society, while at the same time 
undermining its role as an agent of public accountability. It is important to note here that 
South Africa’s civil society remains aggressively pro-poor hence the likelihood that the 
state deliberately avoids full accountability to civil society. 
In the context of the GEAR ‘project’, the state asserts its legitimacy through what Jager 
prefers to call ‘procedural democracy’ –that is, cycles of institutions, procedures and 
routines of democratic systems. The most common ‘procedure’ is the five year general 
elections. Jager is not satisfied with this kind of democracy. He advances that by over-
reliance on these procedures, the state tends to alienate ‘substantive democracy’ –which 
  
6 Emphasis by author of this work
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is the redistribution of power to the extent in which citizens can fully participate in the 
decisions that affect them. Some critics contend that the current state consists of elite 
dominance, “…a macro-economic orientation anchored more on growth than on equity 
and the resultant growing army of poor and unemployed/unemployable under classes; 
[and] preference of stability to unrestrained participation” (see Amuwo, undated). 
Others such as Southall (In African Affairs (1998), 97, 443-469) suggest that the current 
state is characterized by centralized power, reflected in the ANC’s dominant of policy 
choices. And incase the ANC argues that it continues to win elections with wide margins, 
Southall cautions that this victory has progressed largely due to weak opposition parties. 
This is not to suggest that the outcome of ANC’s policy dominance has automatically 
produced bleak outcomes. Infact, one might be excused to think that Southall suggests so. 
On the contrary, Southall contends that power centralization within the ANC has created 
“…consolidation of political legitimacy, consistent economic growth, fiscal discipline 
[and] delivery of increased social benefits…” (Southall, In State of the Nation, South 
Africa 2007:6). 
What Southall does not explain is the economic implications of thorough going 
democracy. He seems to understand participation as a good idea that does not necessarily 
translate into development. But as the following section will demonstrate, the idea of 
power centralization as a better way of managing development is potentially 
undevelopmental. The problem with the power centralization logic is that it views 
technocrats as adequately knowledgeable and capable of policy formulation and 
implementation-which is the very nerve centre of the GEAR policy. The LED discourse 
challenges this view and rather tries to link poor outcomes to poor public participation.  
This vein of thought is explored in more details below. 
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2.6. EXPLORING NOTIONS OF PARTICIPATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN APPROACHES TO LED GLOBALLY AND 
IN SOUTH AFRICA
Local Economic Development (LED) is a relatively new discourse, which began to 
feature in literature towards end of the last century. It is traceable on heavy loaded terms
such as decentralization and democratization (see Lootvoet and Freund, 2006)-thus 
suggesting co-evolution with good governance. It emerges from the common arguments 
that undemocratic “…grand development narratives of the post-World War II era” (Binns 
and Nel, 1999:389) have produced contradictory outcomes and therefore failed. As an 
alternative, LED asserts itself as people centered development (Bins and Nel 1999:1-2), 
and as such has given human face to development, -rightly taking its name as what David 
et al. (2005) refer to as ‘humanistic paradigm’. To a reasonable extent, LED is a counter-
revolution discourse in that it seeks to devolve power to common citizens, thus operating 
within the democratization agenda. Below the study will explore the central arguments of 
LED. It will also highlight contradictions that plague the discourse. 
2.6.1. Dis-empowering the Center: Approaches and Definitions of LED 
Many authors agree that LED advocates for capacity building of local communities such 
that they would be able to control and manage their own development (see Helmsing, 
2001, Bartick, 2003, Rodrigue-Pose and Tijmsra, 2005, Nell, 2001, Parahanse et al., 
2006, Hall and Robbins, 2002). The recurring themes in the writings of these scholars are 
public participation and locality development. Issues of governance, environmental 
sustainability and building of local capacity feature prominently in LED discourse.  
In spite of these refreshing articulations, a number of problem issues are presented in 
literature. Lootvoet and Freund, (2006) do not only see problems with definitions of 
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‘local’, but they also determine that the continual intervention role of the state in LED 
discourse brings up problem issues.  They further cite that LED tends to be implemented 
as a one size fits all model-developing and developed countries alike. While Lootvoet and 
Freund’s concerns (2006) are complex yet important, they are partly addressed by Porters
(1998) description of ‘local’ clusters as determined by geographic location. They are also 
partly addressed by the view that ‘local software’7 -that is communities present in a 
particular geographic area, do constitute ‘local’. 
In further inquiry of LED, Blakely (1994) sees LED as an imported concept from 
Western countries, which potentially fail to adequately relate to local contexts. This is not 
surprising given that good governance agenda could well be said to be a western 
generated concept. What needs to be noted here is that theoretical articulations emerging 
from the west appear sympathetic to developing countries, yet in practice they often 
become the very opposite of their intention. By this token, it is hard to imagine that 
personal and group interests do not influence these concepts. It is therefore not a 
coincidence that developing countries are treated with debates on pro-market and pro-
poor LED, concepts which have long been dominant in western thinking of development.   
According to Rogerson (2002:3), pro-market LED tends towards businesses capacities to 
cope with markets, through creating “…individual self-reliance, entrepreneurship, 
expansion of the market, competitiveness, reduction of unemployment and sustainable 
growth”. This approach seems process oriented and advances in support of demand driven 
interventions without interfering with the market system. The pro-poor approach on the 
other hand is outcome based. It seeks to allocate the bulk of policy content to the poor, 
anticipating that interventions would alleviate poverty and create employment. South 
Africa’s experience of classes that possess these seemingly contradicting views has already 
been noted. Pro-poor LED has emerged recently as a rebuttal of the pro-market approach, 
contending that the latter has failed to produce meaningful results in terms of poverty 
alleviation and job creation. 
  
7 This term is used by this author in reference to people.
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In what seems to be the defense of the pro-market paradigm, the WB (undated)
demonstrates how LED has evolved over time. The idea is that it is likely that countries 
might not have adequately identified transitions made by the LED discourse. The Bank
notes three main phases through which LED has undergone as noted below. 
Phase one could be traced between 1960’s and early 1980’s, phase two from 1980’s to 
1990’s and phase three from 1990’s onwards (The World Bank, undated). Phase one 
focused on mobile type of manufacturing, creation of conducive environment for foreign 
direct investment, and investing on hard infrastructure. Cities tended to give large grants 
and loans to investors, provide subsidies on hard infrastructure, allowed tax breaks and 
industrial recruitment techniques, all aimed at investment on the local economy. In Phase 
two LED shifted to business start ups, retention and expansion and sectoral targeting 
strategies. To attain these objectives cities provided direct payments to individual 
businesses, invested in soft and hard infrastructure and established business support 
programmes, which incubated businesses, provided market information and training to 
small businesses owners as well as providing technical support. In Phase three attention is 
given to the entire business environment. Public-private partnerships, networking with 
the private sector and coordinating of clusters for competitive reasons are some of the 
elements, which have become central to LED practice in this phase. Coordination of 
clusters presupposes understanding of value chains and how businesses fit into the value 
chain network. 
The first and the second phase appear to have been largely supply driven. The third phase 
appears more comprehensive. The presence of the private sector as a key actor suggests 
pro-market biases. Within reason then, it might be argued that generally LED appears to 
have shifted from pro-poor to pro market. The ability (or lack of it) of governments to 
financially sustain pro-poor approaches might be the underlying reason for this shift. 
Businesses have received a central focus in all the phases. Helmsing’s (2001:64-71) 
conceptualization of LED as community development, businesses development and 
locality development can clearly be located in Phase three. Also, while community and 
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locality development are highly supportive of businesses development, viewed 
differently, small businesses stimulate development of community and locality 
development. Innovative policies are necessary to ensure these links are sustained. More 
specifically, the role of small businesses in developing local capacity need to be probed 
further- and the section that follows tries to do so. 
2.6.2 Small Businesses role in the Development of the Local 
Economic Base. 
As Helmsing observes, “…one of the guiding ideas of LED is its concern for the 
development of the local economic base” (2001:10), which involves mobilization of 
small businesses to increase their productivity. As recent as 1990’s, geographical 
locations have taken increasing role in development economics (Krugman, 1998) forming 
what has come to be known as economic geography discipline. Central to this school of 
thought is perfect competition. Krugman notes that perfect competition concept emerged 
from attempts to understand and solve the ‘unfair competition’ patterns by businesses. 
Three waves have preceded the economic geography discourse. These include the 
“…New Industrial Organization, which created a toolbox of tractable if not entirely 
convincing models of imperfect competition; the New Trade Theory, which used that 
toolbox to build models of international trade in the presence of increasing returns; then 
the New Growth Theory, which did much of the same for economic growth” (Krugman, 
1998:13).
It is in Michael Porter (1998) where small businesses get a fair deal of policy attention. 
Porter conceptualizes location of businesses as critical to business development. He notes 
that agglomeration of businesses into clusters can enhance learning, innovation, creation 
of new businesses as well as competitiveness. Helmsing (2001) adds that agglomeration 
of businesses can provide opportunities for spin off activities. In support of 
competitiveness, Porter (1998) suggests that productivity largely depends on how 
businesses compete, and not necessarily availability of inputs, or the areas they compete 
in. The benefits accrued by agglomeration can be better exploited through adequate 
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participation of stakeholders. For example sharing of information is likely to affect 
productivity. 
Krugman (1998) observes that economic geography is founded on tendencies of 
businesses to respond to centripetal [market size linkages, thick labor markets and pure 
external economies] and centrifugal factors [immobile factors, land rents and pure 
external dis-economies]. Refreshingly, economic geography treats SMMEs as
indispensably important in job creation and poverty alleviation. Among other 
contributions, research has underlined a wide range of benefits attributable to small 
businesses, as noted below. 
Firstly, studies conducted on demand of small business products, - specifically soap in 
Ghana, furniture in Kenya and bicycles in Malaysia- showed that SMME products tend to 
meet the needs of the poor better than products of macro enterprises (Harper, 1984). 
Secondly, often large stocks in macro enterprises are produced by small enterprises (ibid: 
11). Third, SMMEs can be “…established in rural settings and thus add value to the agro 
products and at the same time facilitate the dispersal of enterprises” (Republic of 
Tanzania, undated) Fourth, majority of SMME’s are owned by local people (Harper, 
1984), and as such they can mobilize local resources for development. 
The aforementioned opportunities provided by small businesses could be utilized as tools 
for LED. From a pro-market standpoint, Krugman (1998:6) notes that the 
“…sophistication with which companies compete in a particular location …is strongly 
influenced by the quality of local business environment…” which require improved [soft 
and hard] infrastructure among other ‘business climatic factors’. Both Pro-market and 
pro-poor approaches share the view that Local Economic Development Agencies 
(LEDA) would be useful for “…building capacity within a local or regional economy to 
create jobs, tackle threats being encountered and exploit opportunities emerging from 
rapid economic, technological and social change” (Hakemulder, 1997:2). Depending on 
the context, if Helmsing (2001:12) is right in arguing that small businesses tend to 
develop their own institutions to regulate and standardize their production, as well as 
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“…lobby for public support institutions and infrastructure” (Helmsing, 2001:12), LEDAs
would best play a supportive role. 
For the World Bank (2007), LEDAs should facilitate inter-firm collaborations, 
institutional development and targeted industrial sectors. Levitsky and Mikkelsen (2001) 
have sought to discredit interventions which treat small businesses as ‘charity 
beneficiaries’. They contend that agencies-which include governments and donors-,
should foster ‘transactional relationships’ with small businesses. In this case the agencies 
need to view themselves as providers and not benefactors of business development 
services (BDS). Levitsky and Mikkelsen (2001) further suggest that intervention services 
should envision sustainability, meaningful participation of all stakeholders and 
performance measurements. It is this critical issue (processes and outcomes) that the 
study now turns to address. 
2.6.3. Processes and Outcomes of Interventions in LED
To sustain facilitation role without impeding profit maximization of SMMEs can be a 
difficult and contentious task. Governments and other intervention institutions tend to 
enforce their own regulations, sometimes with biases towards their own agendas. As a 
result, SMMEs sometimes view government as “…a source of harassment, tax demands, 
delay, regulations and irrelevant requests for information (Harper, 1984:194). Porter 
(1998:6) notes that “…businesses cannot function efficiently under conditions of time-
consuming red tapes…” and dysfunctional court systems. Even worse, sometimes the 
pressure for businesses to adhere to government regulations is matched with 
“…undeveloped infrastructure, poor business development services, limited access of 
SMEs to finance, [as well as] ineffective and poorly coordinated institutional support 
framework” (Republic of Tanzania, 2005:34). 
To avoid problems associated with intervention strategies, in a clear pro-market rhetoric,
the World Bank (undated:13) cautions against BDS programmes characterized by supply 
driven training programs,  “…over-generous financial inducements for inward investors, 
unexplored business retention subsidies, reliance on "low-road" techniques, e.g., cheap 
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labor and subsidized capital, [and], Government-conceived, -controlled, and -directed 
strategies”. The mix of power centralization by government and managerialism by 
businesses owners, lack of skilled labor and technology and biased market structures 
(Barber, et al., 1989:10-16) tend to dampen effectiveness of interventions. Intervention 
strategies also need to address “…skills and knowledge focused on ‘how to’ and ‘who 
with’ issues, regarding inputs and outputs of SMMEs” (Levitsky, and Mikelsen, 2001:3). 
Additionally, Helmsing (2001:15) observes that innovation and investment tend to be low 
among local producers due to the fact that outcomes of innovations or investments 
require new “…investment in other parts, upstream or downstream in the same 
commodity chain”. All the above, among other binding constraints can sometimes force 
small businesses to remain in the informal economy. 
2.6.4 Narrow Territory: Business Development Interventions and 
Problems of Participation and Accountability.
Berg-Schlosser and Kersting, (2003) have already pointed out that clientilism and 
tribalism can be impediments to competitiveness. Thus governments could well practice 
Jager’s procedural democracy- (that is general elections) and remain as open economies
yet retain poor competitiveness due to practices of clientilism and tribalism. These twin 
‘public evils’ are likely to attract corruption where favorite business persons are illegally 
exempted from government regulations, or even worse, they are given extra support 
where as other businesses do not necessarily receive similar privileges. 
Important to note, some of the public evils are more subtle. For example, Sussan de 
Villiers, (2001) has warned LEDAs against over-reliance of ‘representative participation’
which is likely to develop favorite factions. Along this vein, Levitsky and Mikkelsen 
(2001:61) note that SMMEs owners and managers tend to possess “…individualistic and 
anti-state entrepreneurial culture” and are thus prone to representing their individual 
interests.
Also, SMMEs sometimes view organizations that claim to represent them –such as 
Chamber of Commerce- as in reality representing “…the interests of the more influential 
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larger businesses, whose major aim is to prevent newer businesses from competing with 
them” (Harper, 1984:189).  These problems could be prevented through encouraging 
‘voluntary participation’ of small business owners in business support interventions, and 
allowing them to provide inputs into policy content and processes. In this regard, 
decentralization of state power becomes critical. Some countries such as Mali provide 
good examples of decentralization (see The Economist, July 7th –13th 2007) - renowned
as the most decentralized state in Africa. 
The July 7th -13th Economist Magazine (2007:16) notes that by 1991 Mali had 18 local 
communes, as at 2007 there are 702, of which most of them pay taxes to their local 
commune and “…can see the tangible results…”. The current Mali government has given 
extensive attention to building local economy through investment into infrastructure and 
agriculture. Local communities have been taught how to build up canals to capture Niger 
floods, a move which has ‘reversed immigration patterns’ into urban areas (ibid). This is 
just one of the positive impacts of decentralization –or otherwise stated, LED. Higher 
income developing countries, such as South Africa might enjoy similar benefits if the 
decentralization process is effectively implemented. But as will be noted in the following 
section, decentralization in South Africa has been impeded by technocratic tendencies. 
And where decentralization has taken place, unlike in countries such as like Mali, 
decision making processes remain largely within political corridors.
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2.7. PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA’S LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA.
Global LED trends form the basic framework within which, according to Meyer (2004:1) 
and Robbins (2005:1); South Africa has established a legal framework for LED practice. 
Nel, (2001:1) observes that, “…[a]s South Africa shares similarities with both the North 
and the South economically, it is inevitable that LED is experienced in forms ranging 
from urban entrepreneurialism to rural survival strategies”. In this sub section the study 
will look at the shapes and forms of participation that LED in South Africa has taken, as 
well as the challenges that it continues to face in provision of small businesses services. 
LED in global south is not new phenomenon. Infact, LED has been practised in South 
African cities since 1900, with efforts “…mainly focused toward industrial development” 
(Pretorius and Blaauw, 2005:5). What is new about LED is the increasing attention that it 
has received as well as the activities that have followed this attention. Nel (2001) notes 
that in the last decade local governments, community groups and nongovernmental
organizations have all taken aggressive action in favor of LED. Unfortunately for South 
Africa, sliding towards economic programs appears more obvious, than participation in 
LED programs. 
For example, in line with international LED discourse, South Africa’s LED policy seeks 
to improve inter alia, the asset base of poor communities, service delivery and 
infrastructure delivery as a means of addressing poverty (Rogerson, 2002:9). These 
activities respond to the constitutional call for strategic LED, which as Robbins points out 
would provide “…support opportunities for low income individuals and their 
communities” (Robbins 2005:1). 
While poverty reduction forms the bulk of national policy framework, local government 
is constitutionally obligated to manage its own processes of budgeting and planning, as 
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well as provide social and economic development of communities (Republic of South 
Africa; 1996). The municipal system Act of 2000 (ibid) specifically charges 
municipalities to develop integrated development plans, which would help realize these 
constitutional goals. This mandate mis-treats the participation agenda by overlooking
capacities of municipalities as well as complex relationships that might exist among and 
within local institutions, which are highly likely to influence processes of development 
on local level.  
The National LED strategy lays down three main areas as primary (but not exclusive) 
duties of municipalities (National LED strategy; DPLG, 2006). These include; (i) 
Provision of leadership and direction in policy making (by-laws and processes to regulate 
land in manner that reduces the costs of doing business and maximizes the involvement 
of people in the local economy). (ii) Administration of policy, programme and projects in 
the context of growth and development. (iii) Act as the key initiator of economic 
development programmes through public spending, regulatory powers, and (in the case of 
larger municipalities) their promotion of industrial, small business development, social 
enterprises and cooperatives.
An assessment of how South Africa’s small businesses have performed over the last few 
years might enlighten as to whether these articulations have been implemented. Evidence
seems to suggest the opposite. However, before criticisms are presented, as already 
mentioned, it needs to be understood that local spaces are complex. Wilson and Perret 
(2008) for instance have already pointed out that local citizens are not without their 
politics. Also, the task of containing pressures from interest groups is a difficult one. 
Social inequalities are also likely to destabilize the policy environment. Furthermore, in 
regards to South Africa’s LED, focus has been more on state versus market instruments 
and their degrees of intervention. These are few of the challenges that LED in South 
Africa must face. The study now turns to assess performance of small businesses in South 
Africa.
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2.7.1. Performance verdict on Small Businesses in South Africa 
In spite of well established legal frameworks, and in spite of the fact that municipalities 
have established LED units and “…a range of developmental strategies”, Nel argues that 
LED results in South Africa have been less than satisfactory (2001:1). By the same token, 
Kesper and Rajaratnam (2003) report that small businesses have performed poorly inspite 
of the implementation of the national strategy for small enterprise promotion. The 
strategy, they argue, expects involvement of all government spheres, private sector as 
well as donor agencies. Yet, in spite of this call, Kesper and Rajaratnam, (2003:42) note 
that as at 2003, “…eight years of overt SMME promotion have not been able to turn the 
previously neglected small firm economy into a vibrant sector”. A number of factors are 
responsible for this poor performance.
First, the national strategy does not address the way in which all these stakeholders 
should collaborate, hence herein lies a major problem. Reconciling the interests of 
government, the private sector and government are issues of critical importance, yet the 
national strategy assumes these.
Second, as Helmsing (2001b:304) points out “…the position and the positioning of 
territorial production systems within a local-global context” is a major challenge. What
Helmsing refers to is the challenge to ensure adequate balance between local and global 
dynamics.  
Third, globally, and in South Africa, LED discourse has not been fully deconstructed. 
Accordingly, as pointed out earlier, South African public is treated with discussions and 
debates from two main schools of thought; pro-market and pro-poor LED. Included in 
these paradigms are arguments from a wide range of disciplines, the main ones as noted 
by Meyer Stammer (2004) being economic geography, urban planning and regional 
economics. The sociology discipline which relates to social relations remains partially 
involved in the LED discourse. These ideological alliances need to be understood in the 
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context of what Simon suggests as South Africa’s “…politico-economic and social 
transformation” on the one hand and “…changing nature and meanings of the 
development discipline” (2000:1) on the other.
Fourth, centralization of power referred to earlier in the study also determines poor 
outcomes. Thus Morris and Robbins (2006:7) note that centralization of power by the 
Department of Trade and Industry has, in “…all probability hindered significant advances 
on industrial policy content and innovation in South Africa”. As a result, according to 
Freund (2006), skill development, job creation and meaningful reduction of poverty 
remain much of a theory in South Africa. 
Fifth, local and district municipalities face the challenge of institutional incapacities. The 
same problem exists within metro municipalities although to a lesser extent. National 
government however has responded to this challenge by establishing support 
programmes, concurrent to international practice. In this context South Africa has 
established four LEDAs to support local and district municipalities, in Siyanda district 
municipality, Nkomazi local municipality, OR Tambo district municipality and Vhembe 
district municipality (See Pretorius and Braauw, 2005). These LEDAs are established 
under Small Enterprise and Human Development Programme which envisions “…a 
complex set of economic reforms and social change processes” (Republic of South 
Africa; 2007). But this initiative could only address particular forms of institutional 
weaknesses. The question of sufficient number of officials, as well as provision of 
adequate training for efficient delivery is not meaningfully addressed. 
Sixth, policy incoherencies between different levels of government remain an obstacle.
Policy choices on national level have tended to exert more pressure on citizens, who 
respond to the local government in dissatisfaction. For instance, it is argued that South 
Africa’s macroeconomic policy (GEAR) was based on the view that opening to global 
markets would enhance competition- as a demand side- while the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) engaged support of clusters and businesses on the supply side (Morris 
and Robbins, 2006:11). The choice of ‘supply side’ intervention was made in spite of the 
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lack of necessary skills by the DTI (ibid), and its cohorts, such as the small businesses 
and local businesses service centre, the Industrial Processing Zones and the Spatial 
Development Initiatives (see Nell, 2001). Critics of the pro-market paradigm argue that 
South Africa’s open economy has forced upon local authorities the challenge of facing up 
to globalization dis-benefits, such as increasing formal unemployment and declining 
government expenditure on social welfare (Taylor, 2002:2).
Seven, internal constraints such as the complacency among SMME entrepreneurs to 
measure up to global competition, or the distortion in capital and other factor markets 
have been identified as impediments to small enterprise growth (cf. Manning, 1996, 
Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999; Chandra et al., 2001). 
These problems have contributed to the dismal performance to small businesses. 
Importantly, Kesper and Rajaratnam, (2003) note that there are many others that have not 
yet been identified. 
This study does not pretend that these problems are easily solvable. What it suggests 
however is that they are likely to be better addressed through decentralization of policy 
processes –or implementing LED with a ‘participation’ face. The study hypothesizes that 
if the government follows examples such as Mali, it is likely to improve capabilities of 
businesses, as well improve their returns. This would be considerable progress towards 
poverty alleviation and job creation.
This chapter has reviewed literature on governance and state reform, globally and in 
South Africa, relating these to LED. It noted that the good governance agenda, 
considered as critical to democratization lends itself to often distorted definitions of 
‘democracy’. The chapter has presented the argument that the contexts in which the good 
governance agenda developed, potentially distort meanings of participation. This is 
besides LED acute bending towards economic programs yet with vague participation 
practice. 
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The challenge in South Africa’s decentralization agenda seems to be that of institutional 
incapacities to implement the constitutional mandate. This inference draws from 
experiences of ‘unconventional participation’ by the public, reflected in protests and 
demonstrations (see Atkinson, 2007). This eschewed participation might be the apex 
upon which debates on LED have revolved around - pro-market and pro-poor (Bond, 
2002). The pro-poor view understands public participation as a more efficient strategy for 
poverty reduction. Although South Africa has a clear LED framework, small businesses 
have recorded poor performance, under the conditions of bureaucratic inefficiencies, poor 
policy coordination among others. While this chapter has reviewed existing literature, the 
following one will highlight the methodology used to collect primary data, in the quest of 
understanding LED issues in eThekwini Municipality.  
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CHAPTER THREE: PROJECT APPROACH AND 
METHODOLOGY
3.1. STRATEGY AND DESIGN  
This study has utilized qualitative methodology to empirically test how LED processes 
and outcomes treat issues of participation and accountability. Eight in-depth semi 
structured interviews were conducted through a period of three months. Senior officials 
from eThekwini municipality’s Business Support Unit (BSU), Small Enterprise 
Development Agency eThekwini (SEDA), Durban Chamber of Commerce (DCC) and 
KwaZulu Natal Department of Economic Development (DED) were interviewed.  The 
interviewed BSU offices are all based in different locations around the city. These 
include the two main BSU offices located along Victoria Embankment but in different 
areas, Cato Manor Area Based Management (CMABM) based in Intutuko Junction and 
Umkhubane Youth Centre (UYC) based in Cato Manor. 
The study was primarily interested in understanding the perspective of agencies in 
regards to small businesses participation in policy processes. This option was determined 
by the objective of the study. By selecting the perspective of business support agencies, 
the study recognizes that views of small businesses warrants undivided attention as 
recommended in chapter five. 
In terms of the research design, purposive and snowballing sampling techniques were 
used to choose respondents. The author selected key officials in the various organizations 
anticipating that these would provide comprehensive and organizational view of small 
businesses related LED. Due to unavailability of some of the officials, snowballing 
technique was used where other officials were recommended by their colleagues in the 
process of the interview. All respondents had obtained tertiary education, and their 
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experiences ranged from limited to vast experiences on government as well as business 
operations.  
3.2. INTERVIEWS 
The questionnaire essentially tested the extent in which bureaucrats understood the 
formulation process as well as the content of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and 
the scale in which eThekwini municipality’s small businesses related LED was 
participatory. It also sought to understand the existing development outcomes relating to 
small businesses, who determines these and on what basis. 
The interviews took place in the respective offices of the respondents. Prior appointments 
had been made, and, questionnaire and abstract of the study had been electronically 
mailed to all respondents in advance. Follow up of the appointments was made through 
the phone. A tape recorder was used to record the interviews. The interviews were then 
transcribed and themes identified. 
Officials from the Business Support Unit, the Durban Chamber of Commerce and the 
Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) were interviewed. The author chose to 
interview two officials from the provincial LED unit; with the intention of obtaining 
‘outsider’s’ yet relevant perspective of the DCC, BSU and SEDA functions and 
processes.  
The Business Support Unit is a government institution, tasked with support of small 
businesses through promotion of healthy business environment, infrastructure support in 
form of rentals and, business linkages (eThekwini Municipality; 2007). Small Enterprise 
Development Agency was established in December 2004 by the provincial Department of 
Trade and Industry 2007). Currently funded by the BSU, SEDA seeks to provide training 
and mentorship to small businesses; empowering them to access finances as well as 
markets easily (ibid). The Durban Chamber of Commerce is a business organization, with 
the objective of promoting “…SMME growth through mentorship, enterprise 
development and business skills training” (Durban Chamber of Commerce; 2007).
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Although these three institutions attempt to coordinate their activities together given their 
common objective; as the findings demonstrate, this coordination does not always 
translate into reality. 
3.3 NATURE OF RESPONDENTS. 
Overall, eight officials directly involved with small businesses policy formulation and 
implementation were interviewed. Officials from four different offices of the BSU were 
interviewed, while one official from one SEDA and one from DCC were interviewed. 
The reason for a higher number of BSU interviews is that the BSU operates differently in 
different areas, but also there are many BSU offices involved in small business support
services than DCC and SEDA.
The officials are coded as below:
a. BSU official one –BSU office based in Rennies House, Victoria Embankment 
b. BSU Official two –BSU office based in Windermere Street, Victoria 
Embankment
c. BSU Official three – Umkhubane Youth centre based in Cato Manor
d. BSU Official four – BSU office based in Cato manor Area Based Management
e. DCC official one – DCC office based in the City Centre
f. SEDA official one – SEDA office based in Johannes Nkosi Street (Former Alice 
Street)
g. Provincial LED official one – Department of Economic Development based in 
Gardener Street
h. Provincial LED official two - Department of Economic Development based in 
Gardener Street
Six of those interviewed were black African male, one was Colored male and one was a 
Colored woman. In terms of work experience, two officials (SEDA official and one 
Provincial LED unit official) have been in their current posts for less than six months, 
two for just over a year (DCC official one and BSU official two) while the other four 
(BSU official one, BSU official three, BSU official four and Provincial LED official two) 
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have held their posts for over two years. All the officials have attained tertiary education, 
ranging from post-Metric diploma to a Masters Degree. All the officials were interviewed 
in their own offices. 
Given that the study was qualitative in nature, and that officials preferred to talk freely in 
regards to their portfolios, officials were at liberty sometimes to deviate from the 
questionnaire. This deviation however still fell within the broader context of participation 
and accountability of small businesses related LED. The following sections point to the 
responses generated by the fieldwork.  
3.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There are a number of constraints involved in this study. First, the choice of agencies that 
seek to support small businesses; instead of the businesses themselves potentially leave 
out an important perspective in regards to small businesses related LED.  The project 
mostly interviewed government officials in which case it omits a clear perspective from 
non-state stakeholders. Although Government officials do represent other stakeholders’
views- sometimes due to their interaction with non state actors, there is a risk that indirect 
representation of these views might be highly selective. 
Following the theoretical tools utilized by this study, however, the tendencies by 
powerful stakeholders to hijack processes requires an investigation of the ‘powerful 
actors’ such as state officials. The study recognizes that seeing things from government 
officials perspective only a partial picture.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS. 
This chapter presents the findings of the field work systematically. A comprehensive 
analysis of these findings is provided in a later chapter. The questionnaire (see appendix) 
drew attention to two main themes; namely, respondents’ awareness of contents and 
processes of the IDP, and, respondents’ awareness of contents and processes of LED. The 
broad framework upon which the themes construct upon is in turn informed by the 
following sub-themes. 
(a) The context and approach of participation and accountability in Integrated 
Development Planning in eThekwini Municipality
(b) The context and approach of LED planning within the IDP and an exploration of 
participation and accountability within these processes
(c) Reflections on IDP with a specific focus on LED processes to examine related 
bureaucratization and democratization frameworks Reflections on how 
governance approaches in support of greater participation and accountability 
could enhance LED outcomes
The order of this chapter is as follows. The first sub section outlines eThekwini’s IDP, 
followed by participation and accountability focus on eThekwini’s IDP.  Subsection three 
enlightens on LED programmes in eThekwini with a focus on small business. Finally 
respondent perspectives about the IDP processes are presented. 
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4.1. INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN ETHEKWINI 
MUNICIPALITY 
In November 2002 eThekwini municipality prepared a Long Term Development 
Framework [LTDF] after what Ballard et al. (2002:266) refer to as “…a lengthy 
community consultation process”. In June 2003 a 5 year plan (the Integrated 
Development Plan) was adopted “…to provide a more detailed framework for the 
council’s activities over a 5-year period” (ibid; 267). As these authors suggest, although 
in a back and forth and often disjointed momentum, eventually eThekwini’s first IDP 
(2003-2007) was highly participatory under the guidance of Mike Sutcliffe [the then city 
manager], particularly given the city manager’s performance contract would be based on 
the implementation of the IDP. 
The process of formulating the IDP, as per the DPLG guidelines (Department of 
Provincial and Local Government; 2009) is as follows: 
IDP 
Phases
Action item Role of Public
Phase 1 Assessment of existing level of development
Priority issues or problems
Information on causes of priority 
issues/problems
Information on available resources.
Public perception of their 
socio-economic problems 




Public participation takes 
place in the form of a 
public debate on the 
appropriate ways and 
means of solving 
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problems.
Phase 3 Performance indicators
Project outputs, targets, location
Project related activities and time schedule
Cost and budget estimates.
This is a technical 
process, experts are 
engaged for input. 
Phase 4 5 year financial plan
5 year capital investment programme
Integrated Spatial Development Framework 
Integrated sectoral programmes (LED, HIV, 





Reference to sector plans.
Phase 5 Draft is submitted to the council for approval. 
The council needs to ensure that the IDP 
complies with the legal requirement before it is
approved.
Draft is  given to the 
public to comment
Phase 6 Submission of the final document to the 
Provincial government, in order to assess that 
the IDP complies with the requirements of the 
Act and also that it is not in conflict with IDPs 




4.2 PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ETHEKWINI’S 
IDP AND LED PLANNING.  
EThekwini has made some progress in engaging the public, as it concerns developmental 
planning (See Heller, 2001; Hindson and Ngqulunga, undated). But while efforts have 
been made to encourage public participation in eThekwini’s IDP process, Hindson and 
Ngqulunga (undated:13) argue that profound challenges still exist. Such include 
difficulties in the integration of former white local authorities, as well as shifting focus 
from “…promoting investment and maintenance of the urban core to promoting 
infrastructure and service development within the urban peripheries and to foster the 
practices of participatory and partnership based development”. Moffett and Freund 
(2004) detect overwhelming [Durban] elitist interests in eThekwini economic 
development processes, even though these elites are fragmented along racial lines. In 
sum, there are worrying fractures within eThekwini IDP’s ‘participation’ rhetoric. 
4.3 SMALL BUSINESSES RELATED LED IN ETHEKWINI
Small businesses related Local Economic Development in eThekwini municipality 
occupies a large space in the municipality’s development journey. Robbins (2005) for 
example lists nine SMME related programmes which had a direct impact on improving 
the conditions of the poor, in the period between 1994 and preceding 2005.  Robbins also 
mentions value chains as a strategic economic method for Durban, as well as the 
emerging tendencies of economic support units to focus on improving the informal 
economy. It is important to mention that these SMME related LED programmes are 
included in eThekwini’s first IDP (covering the period 2003-2007). So does the value 
chain epoch which continues to thrive even through the second IDP phase.    
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4.4 RESPONDENT PERSPECTIVES ABOUT THE IDP 
PROCESSES.
With the uneasy parallels between thorough going small businesses related LED, and 
participation fault lines, this section reports the perspectives of selected respondents, in 
the efforts to uncover issues underlying participation cum IDP interface. The section  
seeks to address a number of specific issues as noted below. 
First, focus is directed towards processes that have underpinned the development of 
eThekwini municipality’s Integrated Development Plan. Second, the processes 
underpinning the emergence of LED and SMME-related support and development 
programmes in eThekwini municipality are explored, before attempts are made to 
understand the contexts that have influenced LED and IDP processes are presented in 
section four. Unraveling of the degree in which processes of the IDP and small business 
related LED in the municipality have been aligned is attempted in section five, while in 
section six  the quest to greater emphasis on accountability and participation is made. 
4.4.1 IDP Content and Process
This section examines respondents’ perspectives on the IDP processes in eThekwini. The 
core function of this section is to outline the understanding of the IDP processes by those 
who are meant to facilitate both its formulation and implementation. Section 4.1 above 
outlines the IDP formulation guideline. 
When asked about the process of IDP formulated, of the eight officials interviewed one 
official claimed that he had never been involved and as such had no idea of the process. 
Three officials claimed that they were not involved although they affirmed that the 
process is consultative and only one claimed to be aware of the process, ascertaining that 
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it was participative. Three officials did not respond to the question citing “no comment”. 
Their responses are as follows: 
“…Well I’m not directly involved in terms of coordinating IDPs. There is a department 
that deals with that part but I know that…it is done through consultation…and it involves 
communities through their organizations, wards, and I think they’ve got a strategy where 
they go to each and every ward to consult communities” (BSU official two)
“Management Unit would be the best to enquire from… but it’s a consultative process 
between community, government and the private sector” (BSU official one)
“…I have very limited knowledge but am…its participative, stakeholder involvement, 
ensure that there is alignment with national as well as provincial policy such as ASGISA, 
Spatial Development Plan, so obviously in alignment and synergy” (Provincial LED 
official one)
“Somewhat familiar at least to a certain extent. I think it is transparent, and consultative.
It is democratic and it’s got its social economic goals…you see it addresses the inequities 
of the past” (BSU Official three)
“Since I came here …to my knowledge, since I joined DCC I haven’t been involved. Not 
even in LED” (DCC official one).
The one [DCC] official who claimed that he had not been involved in IDP formulation 
has been involved with the DCC in a period of less than a year, thus reducing surprise
levels. But other surprises are identifiable in the cases of three officials [BSU official 
three, BSU official two and BSU official one] given that these have been involved in 
their respective (senior) posts for over a period of two years. The latest IDP was 
formulated during their tenure. It is also notable that all but one official expressed
confidence in awareness of the IDP.
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In regards to stakeholder participation in the IDP process, six out of the eight interviewed 
officials expressed the view that government was the most influential stakeholder in both 
process and content of the IDP. Those who shared this view also contended that 
development is government’s agenda, in which case government has the duty to manage 
policy processes as well as implementation of the deliverables. On similar account, 
officials cited constraint of financial resources as a critical determinant of government’s 
monopoly of policy process. When asked how financial resources impacted on monopoly 
of processes by government, three of the eight officials observed that unavailability of 
resources tends to determine prioritization of development programs, which results to 
dropping of some programmes in favor of few deliverables. One official noted that;
“…In terms of the implementation there would be a process of prioritization, and linking 
that to what funding is available” (Provincial LED official one). 
Two other respondents commenting on the same question said,   
“…well, the main stakeholder is government. It’s their brain child and as much as it may 
have the power they still have the responsibility to make sure it filters down because 
without the involvement of businesses as well and communities it won’t actually be 
successful. But the drivers of the IDP is definitely the government” (SEDA official one).
“…Government officials ultimately write the IDP, and as such the Government 
Officials will most likely dominate the content of the IDP” (Provincial LED official two).
In responding to the question of the importance of stakeholder participation, two extreme 
views were presented. One official claimed that community participation was rather 
unnecessary process, another shared the opposite view, citing that consulting 
communities is critical for development, two others claimed that participation would 
enhance ‘ownership’ of programs by communities while three understood participation as 
a ‘human thing to do’. These responses are as follows:
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“…nothing new is most likely to result from…consultation” (BSU Official one)”.
“Local government is quite clear on what communities’ needs are. Low income 
communities need basic services; upper income communities need sanitation services e.g. 
emptying of dustbins on time. No need to extend the process, while nothing new is most 
likely to result from this consultation” (BSU Official one).
“…the measurables of success of programmes of the government definitely will be the 
community. And if they do not seek to find their participation, it is highly likely that they 
won’t get the result intended-that is the development of communities”. (SEDA Official
one)
On the choice of indicators outlined in the IDP, all the interviewed officials noted that 
government uses economic growth and job creation as the critical indicators for the 
performance of small businesses. Some said, said: 
“…I think the outcomes we consider would be number of jobs created…you know if it’s a 
one man show …we wouldn’t fund it”. (Provincial LED official one)
“Performance indicators are determined by national guidelines…and we are talking of 
economic growth and job creation” (BSU Official two).
All the interviewed officials noted existing mismatch between government priorities and 
businesses priorities. On this, some officials observed that tensions exist between 
government officials and business owners while others felt that the government tends to 
take long process in addressing issues that affect small businesses, against the preference 
of small businesses which would rather choose a faster system to address their problems. 
On this account; official said; 
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“…those political things you know how corporate and government work. Corporate can 
travel 120 km per hour and government at 80 km per hour. Totally two different things” 
(DCC Official one).  
“…the level of trust is very low and the processes and time frames between these 
groupings misalign. Government is very bureaucratic; long turnaround time; businesses 
are quick to make decisions and very impatient so that’s very frustrating. And of course 
businesses align in terms of making use of opportunities that are available whereas 
government just goes with the process of authorization” (Provincial LED official one).
“The relationship is not necessarily a robust relationship. Especially between 
government and Durban Chamber of commerce. But this is not to say there is no
relationship. Usually complaints increase as soon as projects begin to take shape” (BSU 
official two). 
Where the study sought to understand the performance measurements which, according 
to officials, small businesses prefer to use, four officials claimed that businesses would 
prefer shorter span processes.  The four other officials, three of whom had finance 
professional background mentioned that businesses would prefer easier access to finances 
as well as markets. They posited that; 
 “They probably would prefer more outcome oriented programs as well as deadline 
focused” (BSU official one).
“I think small businesses would use indicators in terms of how much funding they  
receive from government. I think they would measure in terms of access to markets –  
there is improved access to markets improved access to finance, ….access to markets  
that in terms of forward access as well as backward access….backward in terms of 
supply chain, their suppliers, and forward …if they get opportunity to sell their product”
(Provincial LED official one).
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Officials who underlined access to finance and access to markets as critical indicators 
also indicated that government seeks to use similar indicators. One of the three officials 
cited that the indicators under discussion are nationally legislated; but they also link with 
international directives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). What is 
interesting however is that, five of the eight officials mentioned that small businesses are 
not involved in the choosing of these indicators, claiming that;
“Although we use organizational score card, there is no actual input from end user 
clients” (SEDA official one).
The SEDA official referred to ‘organizational card’ as government’s attempt to measure 
performance although this too remains the domain of officials and not community. SEDA 
interacts extensively with small businesses in which case the official spoke from a rich 
experience perspective, inspite of occupying his post for a period of less than a year.
Three of the eight officials shared the view that the platforms afforded during business 
fairs are sufficient platforms for participation by stakeholders. 
Some officials however noted underlying problems within businesses, which potentially 
impact negatively on [businesses] performance. One official expressed frustrations; 
rooted in his expectation of initiatives from small businesses, citing that; 
“The small businesses; there seem to be lack of organized voice in terms of the 
challenges that they face. Because people are divided. Durban Chamber of 
Commerce…they do provide voice platform…but I think most of their members are 
people who are already well established. Even if there are small businesses it’s a small 
business that is well established…you know…may be a guy is running a franchise 
...so.…I mean the person is fine. … So we can’t have a balance in terms of intervention; if 
those that we are trying to assist are not organized, they don’t have a dynamic organized 
voice” (BSU official two)
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Another official directly countered the above perspective, noting as follows. 
“Well …yes…they are very vocal, and obviously minutes of meeting are held because 
their inputs are always addressed” (Provincial LED official one). 
In comparing the above responses, BSU official two was most experienced while 
Provincial LED official one is involved on financial issues in regards to small businesses. 
It is likely that both responses are correct, except that one interacts with businesses from 
a financial perspective while the other interacts with them from a policy perspective. 
When asked about what could be done to improve the situation, one official suggested 
expansion of human resource base from government’s side, while another suggested 
better consultation with communities. The former official oversees the business 
incubator, which has attracted numerous businesses while the latter is involved in training 
of new entrepreneurs-which involves intensive interaction with the community; their
responses are likely to reflect the challenges in their area of function. The responses were 
as follows; 
“No adequate human resources from government’s side. Customer relations by 
government could be improved. Then things could be done differently” (BSU official 
four)
The SEDA official pointed out that;
“… the IDP programs basically provide tools and resources and SEDA’s are one of the 
tools that the government when structuring their programs they must enquire for 
information on how to improve designing LED programs from SEDA and the other 
agencies that are helping to improve small businesses. Because if they are not involved 
they will actually want SEDA and the others to carry the mandate of their programs. So 
I’d like them to help us to get more involved, and show them that we’ve got to be part of
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decision making when it comes to the programs design and implementation” (SEDA 
official one)
On the question of possible unintended outcomes of policy interventions, two officials
demonstrated optimism that no negative unintended outcomes existed-at least as far as 
they were aware of.  Their response was as follows:
“Good problems, that is, in areas without development. E.g. Umlazi Mega city councilors 
and community were happy that the Mega City was constructed People have taken 
ownership of local projects, which was unexpected” (BSU official one).
“We don’t have negative. There are themes that through our intervention the last thing is 
to make businesses to be passive…” (BSU official two)
It is important to note that during the time of the interviews, BSU official one was tasked 
with policy and strategy while BSU two was the head of the BSU and therefore biases 
towards the existing policy practice might be traceable for example in the above 
responses.  
In response to the question on the interaction between LED stakeholders and small 
businesses, some officials related the question to accountability issues. The SEDA 
official in particular noted a dilemma on the issues of accountability, which in turn 
determines the kind of relationship shared by the stakeholders.
“… SEDA is accountable to communities as well as government – as this is their 
initiative. SEDA is  … accountable to the community as well because if we don’t give 
funds to the communities the auditors will say, but funds are still where we left- it means 
you are not supporting small businesses” (SEDA official one). 
BSU official two noted that BSU as a line function department covers a vast area in 
which case it is unlikely to give the required attention to small businesses. The same 
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official mentioned that this resulted to a different approach where eThekwini 
municipality in collaboration with the European Union (EU) are piloting Area Based 
Management (ABM) programmes, with wide ranging goals, including small businesses 
development. 
BSU official four explained that the BSU office based in Cato Manor (within ABM 
programme) has committed itself to analysis of every business in the Cato Manor area. 
According to this official, this initiative seeks to ensure provision of mentorship as well 
as access to market intervention. The official pointed out that even though businesses 
might belong to a particular sector, there are diversities in those businesses hence the 
need to understand the dynamics of individual businesses. This official’s experience 
within senior government position spans over twenty years.  
BSU official three from the Business Incubator (BI); (also an initiative of the BSU) 
referred to the fact that BI is sector specific. He also pointed out to the fact that BI seeks 
to graduate businesses after five years. He further shared the views expressed by BSU 
official two, that BSU covers a vast area and that this is a challenge given the lack of 
human resource from the BI side. Since the inception of the BI in 2003, the official 
mentioned that, as at September 2007 none of the incubated businesses had graduated 
into the formal sector yet. He was however confident that businesses were doing fairly 
well. He admitted that there is no monitoring and evaluation mechanism in place. 
The SEDA official mentioned that SEDA provides supply inputs for small businesses 
growth and competitiveness. He also observed that SEDA establishes lifelong
relationships with businesses.  
In response to the question on how DCC relates to BSU, the DCC official observed that 
collaboration between the two agencies operates from senior officials. This pattern, 
according to the DCC official response, tends to obligate the other officials on the 
hierarchy to work together. This official tended to view government as exclusively 
political, while he viewed DCC as a cooperate businesses. At some point he said 
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“business is business and politics is politics” referring to government and the Chamber.
This is not surprise given that he is formally ABSA Bank employee, with financial 
background, yet seconded to the Chamber. He mentioned that;
“The working relationship start from the top with the city manager and the 
president…we’ve just got to forge that since we have to work together. Durban Chamber 
of Commerce (DCC) is independent nonprofit organization. Like when it comes to the 
SMME desk, I’m an ABSA employee, full time, seconded to the Chamber at the SMME 
desk” (DCC official one). 
The same official indicated that
“We still need to work more closer together…but still you find some people still need and 
want to hold their own things to themselves. So if you move into somebody’s territory, 
there is something that they want to hold close to their heart, you can’t take it away. 
Business is business and politics is politics. ..But I think our relationship with 
municipality because it comes from the top. With SEDA the relationship is coming out 
nicely” (DCC official one)
On the same question, BSU official two noted that BSU accounts ‘directly’ to Ward 
councilors and ‘indirectly’ to stakeholders. This official, as already mentioned, was the 
head of the BSU during the time of the interview, and therefore accountability to existing 
government structures reflect in his response. He gave the following view;
“Well as the Unit we are part of the municipality. We directly account to the 
municipality. We account to councilors. By accounting directly to the councilors …that is 
the first step in terms of accountability. Which is a very formalized form of 
accountability. We go to council meetings in terms of programmes not in a negative way, 
but to account in terms of programs that we are doing, which in any case those 
programmes would be approved by the council through the IDP. Then there is indirect 
accountability to the stakeholders, also to the constituency that we are based in. We 
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directly account to people because when you have conferences and workshops I mean 
that also serves as platforms of accountability because we get challenged, we get views 
both positive and negative views, and we have to respond to those views. And you can’t 
ignore those voices” (BSU Official two)
Asked on whether there were overlaps of responsibilities between agencies, five officials 
were not aware of any overlaps, one was not necessarily concerned, and two mentioned 
that overlaps did exist. The DCC official less concerned about overlaps pointed out as 
follows:
“You must remember we focus on our members. And we have about 3500 members, 80% 
of that is SMME’s. In South Africa we are the biggest Chamber” (DCC official one)
The SEDA official who had experienced overlaps of policies pointed out the following 
illustration:
“I would say yes…because some departments are still viewing themselves as separate 
departments with no understanding of the integration. But some departments do and can 
see areas of common goals. A live example…we are an agent of Umsobomvu…but if you 
go to Umsobomvu development officer they will tell you we hardly know what SEDA 
does. So you see it happens within the offices that some offices and departments are not 
clear about what other departments do and some others think it’s the responsibility of 
others to do only to find that we are all aiming at one thing but it is not properly 
integrated” (SEDA official one)
BSU official three narrated that on one occasion, the provincial government provided 
funds to businesses through Ithala Bank, and after businesses had drafted their business 
plans and accessed the funds, there was an overwhelming number of businesses in BSU 
offices seeking for business development services. The BSU had not been informed that 
after businesses accessed funds they would require business support services. 
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4.4.2 LED Content and Process
This section deals with the second theme of the questionnaire; officials’ understanding of 
LED content and processes.
All the interviewed officials demonstrated some degree of awareness of LED, although 
not without efforts. What is of interest is that those who have worked for longer periods 
within government demonstrated equally vague understanding as those who took their 
posts recently. They understood LED as follows;   
“It is basically to determine the effectiveness and impact of LED. That is; municipalities 
and strategies that are in place so it’s basically looking at is it effective. So it is a 
strategy and the program looks at the impact of running the municipality especially when 
you are looking at eThekwini. So through LED we can actually evaluate where 
municipalities are growing whether they are not changing or they are getting worse”
(BSU official three). 
“LED I think it’s a partnership between various stakeholders in the community, 
government, private sector, in developing the local economy by enterprise development 
and thus creating jobs, and ultimately alleviating poverty” (Provincial LED official one). 
“Obviously when you see local direct investment growing and also seeing foreign direct 
investment …increasing then I think we can start to say we now talking about economic 
growth. Of which I think it’s something that has been happening, maybe in the last two or 
three years. There has been growth in terms of business, growth in the construction 
industry; there is hope that those who are supposed to be creators of jobs –government,
are doing their job. I think all these sectors put together they contribute to local 
economic development” (DCC official one).
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“Local Economic Development is simply government’s program for local development”
(BSU official one).
“LED I think it’s a partnership between ...various stakeholders in the community, 
government, private sector, in developing the local economy by enterprise development 
and thus creating jobs, and ultimately alleviating poverty” (SEDA Official one).
When asked about how LED and IDP related, officials pointed out that; 
“There is definitely strong relationship synergy, and their objectives are strengthened in 
each. I mean this is generally; …eThekwini … are still developing LED strategy. They 
have not formulated one yet, so just generally” (Provincial LED official one)
“Well the IDP addresses those issues adequately because it talks to primary services. 
LED speaks to secondary services. So both address primary and secondary support to 
businesses. You know  if a business is manufacturing a certain product, but that 
particular business because it’s small I mean the product is failing but the business is 
very small it cannot afford to export itself to the international market, then the 
municipality will come with a secondary support. When you see that the manufacturing 
sector is declining because there is no sharing of information, there is no sharing of 
knowledge, and there is no integrated support that is given to those who are involved in 
the manufacturing sector  by government, then primary support in this case it will be like 
for example if you create a cluster, a manufacturing cluster, so where you bring in big 
and small businesses, with support agencies together under one forum to discuss issues 
that are pertaining to challenges faced by those who are operating in that particular 
sector” (BSU official two)
“LED attends to private sector inputs, IDP accounts to public sector input” (BSU 
official one)
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Although monitoring and evaluation theme did not feature in the questionnaire, officials 
drew attention to the issue. The DCC official noted that M&E mechanism did not exist, 
nor did he understand its value. BSU official two and three reported that M&E 
mechanism did not exist, although in the near future it would be implemented. The SEDA 
official explained that M&E mechanism did exist. The three other officials continually 
deviated from the question. 
The responses follow below:
“…well majority of the people here have moved from informal to formal, so there is this 
and that…there are few things that they are looking at….just here and there…and they 
are mainly looking at networking opportunities where they can be able to do business”
(DCC official one) . 
Asked if there was a data base in place which assisted to track these patterns, the official 
responded; 
“No we don’t….because most of those people are already in the formal  ...they know 
what to do. They don’t need hand holding. Majority of them …because if you also do that 
you’ll be taking most of our time and unfortunately we do not have human capital” (DCC 
official one). 
The line function BSU also does not have a monitoring mechanism in place, although 
BSU official two claimed that in the near future monitoring of business performance will 
be established. The Cato Manor ABM BSU does track the progress of businesses 
according to BSU official number four. The Umkhumbane Youth Centre BI has not 
started a business follow up process but claimed that in the coming year they will have a 
monitoring mechanism in place as pointed out by BSU official number three. From 
SEDA side, an official noted, 
80
“…we have to monitor every step of whatever the person does ….because we look at 
SEDA’s intervention and what it has done to that particular business that we have 
interacted with. So once a relationship is created with SEDA, with that business is 
lifelong” (SEDA official one). 
4.5. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has picked up the themes that appeared in the questionnaire. The poor 
awareness of IDP process among officials, as well as the ensuing [widespread] 
disconnect with the development value of participation is a matter of grave concern. 
Notwithstanding the few government officials who appear genuinely committed to the 
participation agenda, those who demonstrate apathy play a significant role in de-railing 
the participation project.  The lack of monitoring and evaluation processes is also a 
matter of worry. 
81
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF FIELD WORK 
MATERIAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents the findings presented in chapter four and relates these to the 
literature review. The analysis presented in this chapter draws attention to matters that 
relate to the objective of this study. The chapter will also present policy recommendations 
mainly to the eThekwini’s Business Support Unit, the Durban Chamber of Commerce, 
and Small Enterprise Development Agency. The recommendations are potentially 
relevant to institutions that play similar roles as the above agencies. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section will analyze important 
themes already pointed out in chapter four. Section two presents recommendations that 
emerge from the analysis. Section three proposes areas of future research while section 
four forms the conclusion. 
5.1. ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY FIELDWORK MATERIAL AND 
 SECONDARY SOURCES
The order of this section is as follows: First will be analysis of officials’ interaction with
the IDP. Second, the different ways in which officials conceptualize participation of 
stakeholders is noted. Third the relations between BSU, DCC and SEDA are assessed. 
Next the choice of indicators and how government influences these will be highlighted.
The fifth subsection will grapple with the question of how officials engage the LED 
discourse. This will be followed by analysis of relationships between officials and 
business owners. Section seven attends to monitoring and evaluation issues.  
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5.1.1 Officials and the IDP
In the foreword of the eThekwini municipality’s 2006-2011 IDP, the incumbent mayor 
Mr Obed Mlaba invites the civil society to “…measure us against targets that are based 
on strategic IDP programmes” (eThekwini IDP: 2006). This appeal does not only place 
insurmountable challenge to officials, but also functions as a gauge through which 
performance of development initiatives within the municipality can be weighted. This 
appeal presumes thoroughgoing dialogue between institutions and officials- and by doing 
so pre-supposes high levels of awareness. 
Yet, in general critical stakeholders reveal strange vagueness of awareness, on the 
process of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Going by this poor awareness, IDP 
process exists in theory -and even this theory is often vague. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that some of the officials when asked about the main steps followed in the 
formulation of the IDP, they either deferred the question to the management unit or stated 
out-rightly that they were unaware. And even in this dearth, a good number of officials 
did not see it as their duty to understand the process of the IDP, rather the duty of a 
designated department. This awareness is demonstrated in the following extracts, as 
stated by senior officials:  
“…Well I’m not directly involved in terms of coordinating IDP’s. There is a department 
that deals with that part”
“Management Unit would be the best to enquire from… but it’s a consultative process 
between community, government and the private sector”
“…I have very limited knowledge”
Of further interest is that this poor awareness does not appear to trigger future 
commitment –not even given the constitutional [and national] space allocated to the IDP. 
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The deferring of ‘knowledge responsibility’ speaks against the very core of the integrated
process. This is if we consider that the IDP which assumes interoperability of the policy 
framework in both formulation and implementation. It also goes against the very 
objective of the IDP, which requires meaningful collaboration of citizens, government 
and the private sector. 
What raises further concern is that the municipality still forges forward with ‘the next 
phase’ of the IDP even though officials are poorly committed to understanding its process 
and content, leave alone committing to its implementation. In all likelihood, this 
approach will impact negatively on intended beneficiaries in terms of quality of services 
as well as time frames. This likelihood is based on the concern that officials seem to work 
purely on the basis of ‘the call of duty’. Poorly motivated officials will in all probabilities 
produce poor results. If the issue at question is not urgently and adequately addressed, the 
process of service delivery is likely to face serious leakages and, end users are likely to 
be the ultimate losers. 
The non-committal pattern seems to unfold from a number of possibilities. It is likely that 
officials either avoid the responsibility that the IDP brings on them. It is also likely that 
officials view the IDP as lacking realistic content on which officials could commit 
themselves. The assumption that officials are probably disinterested because they are not 
involved in the IDP formulation might not hold, given that officials who are charged with 
formulation and implementation of the IDP illustrate non-committal approach towards its 
implementation. 
5.1.2. Stakeholder Participation
The findings on stakeholder participation suggested diverse views from officials. While 
officials seem to agree on who the main stakeholders are [government, private sector and 
small businesses], they share different views in terms of why stakeholders should 
collaborate. On this, the survey found four categories as already noted in chapter two. 
The first view, which aligns with what Gerring et al. (2005) describe as a centralist state
refered to earlier in chapter two, understands participation as unnecessary given that 
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government is aware of the needs of communities. As chapter two has already cautioned 
these ‘dictatorial’ tendencies often exist in subtle forms. 
What seems to be peculiar in eThekwini’s case is that, this approach exists within the 
local government, and secondly, it exists side by side with other views in the same 
‘decentralized’ space. This experience puts into test assumptions often made in literature, 
that decentralization will provide adequate platform for public participation. It also 
questions the feasibility of the RDP logic that the state should mobilize “…participants in 
the process towards the realization of …goals they have themselves helped to define” 
(Republic of South Africa; 1994:7). In this context, Jager (2006) has already noted that 
South African state tends towards dispositional as well as institutional centralization8.
The second view relies on elected ward committees to represent the public. The process 
of IDP formulation follows this sort of participation, within political corridors. This 
approach goes against the RDP plea, as already indicated in Chapter two. The RDP hopes 
that government will engage citizens through existing [community] forums, driven by the 
idea of voluntary participation of citizens. The assumption made in this view is that 
politicians are free from their own interests and can sufficiently represent public on 
development processes and content. 
  
8 Jager (2006) has described dispositional centralization as the imposition of development duties to the civil 
society, while at the same time undermining its role as an agent of public accountability (see chapter two).
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It has already been mentioned that institutionalized participation potentially excludes a 
section of the public while including others. It is also possible that those who manage to 
get involved in politicized participation find it difficult to present and follow up on their 
perspectives and suggestions, given that politicians are likely to hijack the process. This 
inference is enlightened by political economists such as Poggi, Hobbes, Rousseau and 
Morris (see chapter two), who have argued that the state tends to monopolize resources, 
such that it could achieve its highest ambitions. In this regard monopoly of participatory 
institutions could be seen as an apparatus used by eThekwini municipality to achieve its 
development ambitions. Wilson and Perret caution against this approach, which tends to 
“…translate into mere dissemination or consensus building around pre-determined 
outcomes…” (Berry and Mollar, 2008)
The third perspective assumes that citizens might be interested to get involved in 
development processes, except that they do not possess adequate knowledge around 
policy issues. The main assumption that underpins this approach is the implication that 
technocrats understand policy processes better than the public, and therefore they are best 
suited to monopolize policy processes. In this approach, the presence of the state in 
policy processes appears overwhelming. By defining and directing policy processes 
through political institutions, in all likelihood, eThekwini municipality contributes 
towards alienation of decentralization discourse-what chapter two has already referred to 
as contamination of decentralization. The blame should not be entirely shifted to local 
government though. It has been noted that the national strategy for small businesses 
development does not address the question of how all stakeholders should collaborate. In 
this way, local government is left to define its own way of coordinating stakeholders. 
The fourth approach, which appears more pragmatic, suggests that community 
participation is of intrinsic value in development process. It deliberately makes efforts 
towards accommodating all stakeholders. LED as defined by Helmsing subscribes to this 
view. Remarkably, some officials share this perspective. There is hope therefore; that it is 
not all bleak as far as LED is concerned in eThekwini municipality. The challenge 
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though, is that this approach exists side by side with the above mentioned views, in which 
case its influence on direction of policy processes is potentially limited. 
These views on participation have been highly influential in determining processes of 
small businesses related LED in eThekwini municipality. The first three views largely 
place small businesses on the margins or exclude them from policy formulation processes 
altogether. These sorts of views replay the urban regime theory, which points to interests 
of powerful actors as mainstream elements in development planning and delivery.
Arguments such as made by Ballard et al. (2007;274) also affirm the tendencies by 
officials and departments to treat the IDP “…simply as a legal requirement rather than a 
serious input to capital expenditure or operational decision making”. Moffet and Freund 
(2005) find similar trends in Durban’s economic development trajectory, except that their 
focus is on the dominance of elites on decision making processes. 
In this ‘interest groups’ hijacking of decision processes, eThekwini local government is a 
culprit. As the findings suggest, government takes charge of policy, in spite of global and 
local decentralization discourses. Despite the fact that the IDP strategic document is 
largely the responsibility of the public, top down fashions of its interpretations appear to 
prevail. This begs the question of the degree of commitment of officials to the 
decentralization discourse. Going by Arnstein’s citizen participation ladder pointed out in 
chapter two, eThekwini’s IDP and LED process could easily fit into the rung 3, 4 and 5, 
which demonstrate ‘degrees of tokenism’. As the findings suggest, ‘placation, 
consultation and informing’ feature prominently as mainline attributes in the IDP and 
LED processes.
There are, however, not many surprises here, as chapter two has already pointed out the 
contradictions that plague South Africa’s democratic discourse. Jager’s (2006) argument 
which notes both institutional centralization and dispositional centralization (see chapter 
two) appears vindicated by the findings of this work. On the other hand the findings do 
not align to Helmsing’s conceptualization of LED (2001b) as community development, 
business development and locality development. The community development aspect is 
87
highly neglected. It is also clear that participation and accountability is curtailed largely 
by the IDP process, rather than the LED process or even small businesses actions. The 
argument here is that the draw back in the IDP impacts directly on the LED process and 
small businesses. Thus, by utilizing the top-down practices mentioned in chapter two, the 
IDP process contaminates the otherwise well meaning decentralization discourse. It also 
distorts the way in which LED treats participation and accountability.
5.1.3. Relationship between Agencies 
Responses as noted in chapter four have demonstrated that relationships between BSU, 
SEDA, DCC and business owners are a cause of concern. This could be seen in the light 
of state monopoly of the process, which probably supports the assumption that processes 
are government’s duty. In addition, agencies such as SEDA find it overwhelming to 
maintain the balance between accountability to the public and accountability to 
government. Accountability to government is based on SEDA’s funding which is 
provided by the municipality’s BSU. The BSU claims to account to councilors, and 
‘indirectly’ to stakeholders through workshops. DCC seems committed to their own 
members with limited interest on collaboration with other stakeholders. For example, 
some businesses appear on both BSU and DCC databases, yet neither DCC nor BSU 
seem committed to close these sorts of gaps. 
The government faces further challenges within its own institutions. One BSU official for 
instance lamented that often decisions from the provincial government tend to override 
local decisions, or, even worse, provincial decisions do not always account for capacity 
of local government. The issue here is poor policy coordination between government 
levels. Chapter two has already demonstrated that participation is now (or at least ought 
to be) a developmental rather than raw democracy question. It is possible that 
development options and capacities of various units of government differ, which in turn 
yields disjointed development networking. Either officials tend to mistrust the ‘other unit’ 
or overwhelmingly trust the unit which they operate from.  
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Generally, interaction between and among agencies seems ad hoc and uncoordinated. As 
a result, businesses are forced to absorb the impact of uncoordinated policy 
implementation.   
5.1.4. Choice of Indicators
The findings have further suggested that, in practice, choice of inputs, outputs and 
outcome indicators are largely government’s domain. Officials pointed out that the 
government pre-determines access to markets and access to finance in attempting to 
service businesses; the ultimate goal being job creation and economic growth. National as 
well as international influences play critical roles in determining these indicators. When 
this practice is placed against the different models of state, it is clear that eThekwini 
municipality under the influence of national and international bodies largely fall under 
the democratic centralist model. 
Of interest is that officials mentioned that business owners are likely to choose access to 
finance and access to markets; of which these are government’s agenda. The issue here is 
that officials assume businesses would prefer these indicators, instead of collaborating 
with them and establishing whether there might be other indicators. 
One business in Cato Manor reported by an official is a case in point. One business 
person started a burglar bars business, in which case he made bars and placed them 
outside his shop anticipating that passersby would be able to purchase. The government 
official approached this business person, and advised that some research was needed as to 
what the most common sizes of burglar bars are. The official also advised that pro-active 
steps such as visiting communities for promotions would be helpful. After adhering to the 
official’s advice, the business person in question became highly successful within three 
years. The business owner was recently awarded a R50, 000 contract to put up palisade 
fencing, a sign that the business has diversifies and grown. 
Access to finance was not the critical issue in the above mentioned scenario, nor was 
access to market. Rather, it was rising up to the challenge of entrepreneurship through 
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enhancing his competitiveness. Better understanding of how markets work largely 
determined growth of his business. 
 
The above example concludes that businesses might have hidden needs which are not as 
apparent as government would like to suggest. Further, presuming that businesses do not 
are covered in government’s choice of indicators, still the critical issue at stake is 
ownership of indicators by small business owners. Even when business owners have been 
invited to contribute towards the content of the IDP- what one official referred to as “the 
big mama presentations”, municipal officials are ultimately responsible for compilation 
of the IDP. This pattern will need to be addressed if policy outcomes are to be improved.
5.1.5. Relationship between Government Officials and Business  
 Owners 
Government’s choice of indicators as well as timeframes; without adequate partnership 
with individual businesses as well as business organizations is likely to create tension 
between government officials and small businesses. The top-down and technocratic 
approach that government seems to adopt is likely to be the foundation of these tensions. 
On one occasion where a government official could not explain why the street vendors in 
Warwick junction had gone on protest in spite of the meetings that the BSU had held with 
street vendor committees serves as a good example. What is evident in this incident is 
that businesses do not seem to fully trust government. Instead, they are more comfortable 
to act collectively through protests, rather than talking issues through with government.
Judged by the above mentioned incident, it appears that; in general, government has 
linked poorly with businesses on two levels, namely, the level of individual businesses 
and, the level of business organizations. This pattern by all accounts alienates small 
businesses inputs into processes even when they possess their comparative advantage; 
that is, their organizational form. Consequently, it is likely that businesses view 
government as existing to curtail their objectives, in which case they are likely to opt for 
defensive mechanisms when addressing issues with government. It is also likely that 
small business owners and representatives are aware of the state monopoly of processes, 
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in which case they could be frustrated by this trend. The government needs to look at the 
question of opaque relationship from small businesses side as a quest for participation of 
businesses stakeholders in all processes of development; as required by LED discourse. 
This of course would mean initiating mechanisms which would improve participation of 
individual businesses as well as business organizations. This task is likely to succeed if it 
is initially facilitated by government. As time goes on the initiative would operate best if 
all stakeholders become mainstream participants.  
5.1.6. LED Processes
Officials demonstrated broad understanding of LED, although the responses appeared 
descriptive rather than normative. While this is already a positive step, it is important that 
officials engage further with the content of LED. The process of LED formulation is 
surprisingly vague to officials. This is not surprising given that officials did not show 
enthusiasm on the IDP within which LED is spelt out. This is not to suggest that officials 
are not involved in LED programs, rather, on the contrary, government’s business 
support initiatives show strong LED orientation. The proposition is that LED is likely to 
have greater impact if officials commit themselves to understanding global and local 
forms of the LED discourse. It is likely that patched decentralization is propped by poor 
engagement with the LED discourse. The problem however, as already mentioned, stems 
from poor engagement with the IDP.
Chapter two has already noted that governance issues and community development are 
strong themes that resonate around the LED debate. Officials need to be clear on what 
constitutes pro-poor LED and what constitutes pro-market LED, and which approach is 
suitable for which context. They also need to be clear on current phase of LED as 
conceptualized by the World Bank, where the Bank views the ‘third phase’ as consisting 
of public private partnerships (PPP), and coordination of clusters. This awareness would 
involve understanding of value chains, as well as enlighten on where businesses fit in 
these chains. Needs of businesses and relevant interventions could then be easily 
identified through locating businesses in value chains. 
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5.1.7. Monitoring and Evaluation
While the findings suggest that SEDA is fairly progressive in evaluating their progress, 
DCC and BSU lag behind in establishing M&E mechanism. To their credit however, the 
BSU and DCC indicated that they anticipate establishing a monitoring system in the near 
future. The provincial government has set a good example in that it has established LED 
M&E unit, which seeks to evaluate performance of programs. 
The fact that DCC and BSU do not have monitoring systems and that they have 
‘postponed’ until some future date implies that monitoring and evaluation is viewed as an 
afterthought, and as such it still remains on the margins of business development 
initiatives. It also implies that although business support initiatives have been 
decentralized, M&E remains a provincial terrain, and as such continues to circumvent the 
decentralization agenda. From a different view, it is likely that agencies are reluctant to 
provide the tools which would be used to measure their performance, in which case they 
would have given out weapons to be used against them. These possibilities cast a major 
shadow in regards to performance of small businesses support initiatives. 
Clearly, the question of accountability becomes difficult to address in the absence of 
M&E mechanism. This is because while M&E exists as a practical system of measuring 
performance, it largely determines commitment to the concept of accountability. To be 
safe though, this author argues that the presence of M&E might not guarantee 
participation and accountability. However, they present tools towards addressing poor 
commitment to participation and accountability. It is clear that, as far as DCC and BSU 
are concerned, the significance of M&E as a central component of decentralized 
development is yet to be realized. 
The above section has essentially drawn attention to the main issues which fall within the 
mandate of this dissertation. They relate to participation, accountability and outcomes in 
the context of small businesses related LED, outlined in the IDP. What follows are 
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recommendations that seek to address the problems highlighted above. This is not to 
suggest that the recommendations will solve all the problems faced by small businesses. 
On the contrary, the study recognizes that there are wide ranging yet critical issues that 
relate to small businesses support within eThekwini municipality, which they fall outside 
the scope of this work. Following the recommendations, the author will suggest areas that 
require future research in the interest of better performance of small businesses. 
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS
5.2.1. Enhancing Monitoring and Evaluation
Rethinking M&E as a mainline tool in eThekwini’s small businesses development 
initiatives is necessary, as it enhances the prospects of accountability. The objective is to
ensure adequate accountability as well as improved performance indicators in regards to 
small businesses development. It is also likely to improve levels of participation and 
consequently positive outcomes. This is not an obvious impact. There need to be a 
deliberate effort to ensure that M&E should not be viewed as a mere economic tool, 
rather as all encompassing lever aimed at enhancing participation and accountability. One 
of the options that could be considered is introduction of a dedicated M&E portfolio with 
a sharp participation and accountability focus in all agencies. The strategy is to ensure 
that M&E becomes an integral part of these agencies; in particular the BSU and DCC. 
This move is likely to attract sponsorship of programs depending on the extent of 
participation as well as the economic success these programs record.
5.2.2. Deepened Participation by Beneficiary Groups
It appears that government officials have a lot to do in order to improve levels of trust 
between the government and businesses. This might be a major challenge for local 
government given that it is trapped within a governance system where technocrats seem 
to operate on a top –down fashion when they relate to small businesses. One of the 
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critical challenges is the assumption that with time officials will learn to relate 
horizontally with small businesses and not vertically. But this assumption might be 
fundamentally flawed. It is necessary to go back to the drawing board, and establish 
mechanisms that would seek to drive change of stereotypes and mindsets of officials.  
In this context it is recommended that interaction between officials and small businesses 
be evaluated on a regular basis. The objective would be to ensure improved relations 
between government and businesses- on both individual and organizational level. Also, 
participation and accountability could be enhanced through ensuring that these concepts 
feature emphatically in literature covering policy objectives and processes. As an 
incentive, awards on the most participatory initiatives could be initiated.
Further on participation of beneficiaries, it is clear that, as far as the IDP and LED are 
concerned, participation counts only in so far as it operates in the context of ward 
committees. This study argues that government’s reliance on ward committees for public 
representation (what Gering et al. (2005) refer to as decentralist state) is likely to impede 
meaningful participation. It is important to note that decentralization can only claim 
legitimacy in eThekwini, in so far as opinions and inputs of small businesses become 
streamlined into policy processes. This will require broader participation patterns; that 
extend beyond ward committees.  The idea is to mainstream participation and not treat 
the concept as a mere political idea. One way in which this could be achieved is through 
engaging existing forums such as churches, community policing forums, as well as 
market centers. These groups are formed voluntarily and are likely to be effective if 
government engages them for policy formulation and implementation.  
This approach which can rightly claim a ‘rights based model’ is founded on the view that 
participation is development in itself. It also intrudes the comforts of current South 
Africa’s LED discourse which treats participation on the margins. Improved participation 
is likely to; firstly, advance public literacy as far as policy content and process is 
concerned and secondly, diffuse tensions between government and businesses, expressed 
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in form of protests and demonstrations. In all probabilities, the end result will be better 
outcomes.
5.2.3. Enhancing Commitment to Policy Processes by Officials
It might be useful to provide platforms upon which government officials can raise issues 
of concern in regards to service delivery. It is unfortunate that officials seem poorly 
aware of policy content and processes, yet this gap is not adequately addressed inspite of 
problems of service delivery. If officials are poorly committed to the IDP and LED 
content, it is likely that they will remain equally indifferent to the role of facilitating 
participation by other stakeholders. The biggest challenge lies not in LED, but on the 
IDP. Ensuring commitment to the IDP will be a good place to begin.
5.2.4. Policy coordination among agencies
Poor policy coordination is a major impediment in small businesses development 
initiatives. This is because some of them get a fair deal of service while others; 
sometimes those who need the services are left out. In this regard agencies need to work 
closely together in all initiatives to avoid overlaps as well as negligence of duties 
anticipating that another institution is responsible.  This initiative is also likely to assist 
towards addressing the issue of meaningful and efficient allocation of resources; where 
the need exists most. 
5.2.5. Improving Transparency between Government and Business  
 Organizations 
Levels of suspicion particularly between government and business organizations exist 
largely due to perceived curtailing of information by government on the one hand, on the 
other, the desire by businesses to maximize profits at the least cost. These assumptions 
require attention for better relations between the two stakeholders. The concept is to 
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ensure that all stakeholders grapple together with the problems that face every 
stakeholder.
Cordial relations between business organizations and government are likely to enhance 
learning and consequently improvement of policy content. The approach should not be 
‘raising awareness’ of government’s problems, rather to deepen levels of participation 
and trust among stakeholders. It is likely that when the role of small businesses
organizations in policy formulation is strengthened, the provincial as well as the national 
government would most likely support development initiatives with greater vigor. In this 
way, accountability of stakeholders is likely to progressively become a reality. 
5.2.6. Deeper engagement of LED processes
According to the field work findings, officials appear to be poorly aware of the 
theoretical debates around LED. This impact on how they go about to implement LED. 
Government needs to get more involved in modern debates surrounding LED, as this is 
likely to improve content; but also would keep officials updated on latest ideas on 
development issues. Lootvoet and Freund (2006) in this regard have raised important 
issues that contribute to the complexity of LED, and so has Blakely (1994). Their call 
should not go un-attended. 
While all the above issues are likely to introduce meaningful change, they are by no 
means exhaustive. The following section draws attention to important themes that 
warrant research. The reason they have been left out in the above section is that they fall 
outside the scope of this study. 
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5.3. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
There are other areas that surround this study, which will be useful if investigated. These 
are outlined below: 
• The perspectives of businesses on participation and accountability are crucial for 
policy purposes. 
• Geographical location of business agencies such as SEDA, DCC and BSU. 
• In terms of small businesses related LED, it would be of interest to conduct study 
on what gender as well as racial dynamics within business fairs are;  what the 
most prevalent age is; and how these influence the IDP and ultimately LED. 
• It would be of interest to evaluate the governance models that force themselves 
on particular departments by the virtue of the programs that these departments 
seek to implement.  
• The idea of abandoning the IDP should not be disputed out rightly, after all, its 
legitimacy hinges on officials willingness and preparedness to facilitate its 
implementation. 
• It will be important to establish the conditions under which government officials’ 
work. 
5.4. CONCLUSION
This chapter has analyzed the findings presented in chapter four. While there are many 
themes that emerge from the findings, seven themes have been selected depending on 
their relevance to this study. The analysis drew attention to poor awareness of the IDP by 
officials. It also looked at different interpretations of stakeholders which largely 
determine officials’ participation behaviors. Thirdly relationship between the BSU, DCC 
and SEDA was explored. The strong influence of government on choice of indicators was 
also noted. Fifthly, the chapter pointed out poor engagement of officials with LED 
discourse, which in all probability impacts on the content and implementation of the 
LED. Poor relations between officials and businesses were also observed. In this case, 
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although the context in which this relationship is managed a difficult one, much can be 
done to improve levels of participation and consequently trust. Further, Monitoring and 
Evaluation has been noted as a critical tool for improvement of participation and 
accountability and ultimately LED performance.  In this case mainstreaming of M&E has 
been suggested. Finally areas of future research have been suggested.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Development is a vast and complex issue. The challenge has always been to ensure that 
political as well a socio-economic institutions function effectively to address the 
underdevelopment question. Important initiatives such as South Africa’s outcome based 
IDP have been used as tools to this end. Ensuring meaningful participation and 
accountability is one of the ways in which institutions could have greater impact on 
development. It is also through engaging stakeholders that strategic initiatives such the 
IDP could be implemented successfully. This study has already pointed out that 
alienation of meaningful participation and accountability is likely to yield dismal results 
as far as development is concerned. 
Chapter two cautioned that often strong interest groups tend to dominate policy processes 
and content. Additionally, it provided an overview of how the governance reform agenda 
has been conceptualized and implemented, globally and in South Africa. It contended that 
understanding of decentralization should not stop at its definition. The contexts of 
emergence as well as the ideological influences have largely determined the content of 
the concept. These ideological patches have undermined the legitimacy of the 
decentralization phenomenon particularly from electorates’ perspectives. However, 
problems extend beyond context and ideological influences. South Africa’s experience 
further problematizes the concept. To balance the interests of various classes through 
ensuring balanced participation is a difficult task that developing countries, not least 
South Africa will continue to grapple with in the foreseeable future. 
On a positive note however, emergence of the decentralization concept draws attention to 
close links between the political and the economic. The governance and reform agenda as 
understood by the World Bank was underpinned by desperation to enhance economic 
growth and therefore alleviate poverty. The birth of decentralization discourse therefore 
saw good governance and development as integrated and interdependent processes. 
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Unfortunately, and incorrectly so, institutions tend to separate these. The danger of this 
dualistic view is that political legitimacy becomes measured by five year national 
elections while development becomes measured by quantifiable inputs and outputs. But 
South Africa’s example demonstrates that winning of elections is determined by many 
issues such as weak opposition. It has also shown that quantifiable inputs and outputs do 
not automatically translate into development, as affirmed by experiences of small 
businesses related LED.
Technocrats who have made progress in integrating the political and the economic face 
another problematic challenge. The officials interviewed in this study were well 
qualified. They therefore approach their work with a level of professionalism, in which 
case they possess the know-how of different dynamics that characterize their work. This 
professionalism does create top down approaches in their relationship with common 
citizens, not least small business owners. It appears that, officials fear devolution of 
decision making processes to small business owners and workers, in that it might take 
away power which rightly belong to them by virtue of their knowledge and experience. 
Chapter four presented the findings of the study, based on the themes that the study 
sought to address through the questionnaire. These themes were IDP process and content, 
and LED process and content. 
Chapter five gave the analysis of the findings. It pointed out a number of problematic 
issues that resonate around processes and content of the IDP and LED. Some of these are 
noted here. Officials seem to accrue low value to participation of small businesses 
stakeholders. This has escalated tensions between officials and small businesses. It has 
also build up levels of distrust and suspicions between the two. Other issues pointed out 
in chapter five are organizational disconnects between small business development 
agencies. Overlapping of responsibilities and poor relationships between these agencies 
are some of the factors that impede meaningful impact on development of small 
businesses. The study has argued that these poor relationships have contributed to low 
levels of accountability to each other as well to the public. This deduction draws further 
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support from the lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in both BSU and DCC. 
Officials’ non committal approaches to the IDP policy process as well as poor 
engagement with LED discourse have been pointed out as major obstacles to 
implementation of the IDP strategies. 
Options which could be helpful in alleviating the above problems have been suggested in 
the second section of chapter five. The study presented the following options. First, 
enhancing of Monitoring and Evaluation as a way of improving accountability and 
accordingly outcomes. Second, the study suggested deepening of participation of 
intended beneficiaries. Third, commitment of officials to policy processes has been 
flagged. The study also drew attention to the need for better policy coordination among 
agencies. Fifth, it has been suggested that transparency among agencies be improved; 
which is likely to diffuse tensions but also improve levels of trust among stakeholders.
Finally, the project has proposed that officials engage more meaningfully with LED 
theoretical debates.
The study has already noted that the above proposals are not by any means exhaustive. 
However, if implemented, they are likely to contribute positively towards outcomes of 
development. But before these recommendations are considered, it is critical to note that 
as far as small business related LED in eThekwini municipality is concerned, tendencies 
of top down approaches exist side by side with the decentralization discourse. Some of 
the interviewed officials demonstrated the willingness to involve stakeholders, while 
others do not see the reason for engaging all stakeholders. The analysis section in chapter 
five has attempted to highlight the views of officials, and the tensions that exist as a result 
of monopoly of policy processes and content by interest groups. This has resulted to 
alienation of the less powerful groups such as small business stakeholders. 
Poor performance of small businesses thus needs to be seen in light of the process under 
which policy content and outcomes evolve. It is only from this perspective that 
commitment could be made to transform the way in which policies are formulated and 
implemented. All in all, it is hoped that this study has contributed towards better 
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understanding of the decentralization discourse. It has attempted to show that while South 
Africa has made strides in decentralizing development through LED programs, power 
centralization patterns within the decentralization rhetoric are real issues that plague 
eThekwini municipality’s small businesses sector. It is hoped that it has enlightened the 
reality that participation and accountability are yet to make meaningful entry into Local 
Economic Development discourse, generally in South Africa, in particular, eThekwini 
municipality. The challenge that this study presents to eThekwini municipality’s small 
businesses agencies is that of translating the decentralization discourse from its current 
rhetoric form into practice with a sharper focus on participation and accountability. This 
will potentially produce better results. 
In the end, modern history presents major challenges to local economics. These can be 
well addressed through meaningful participation and accountability of intended 
beneficiaries. The theory and practice of participation and accountability invades the 
concepts and definitions upon which modern development discourse is founded. By 
treating participation and accountability issues on the margins of development initiatives,
the quest for better outcomes of development potentially become void; in which case we 
fail to learn the hard lessons presented by the development impasse.
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Questionnaire Introduction
This questionnaire forms part of a research project which focuses on examination of how 
small businesses related Local Economic Development programmes in eThekwini 
municipality relates to development outcomes. Small businesses seem to fall short of the 
ambitions set out in the IDP document, despite the fact that the municipality has done 
fairly well in meeting its targets. The following questions are attempts to examine why 
the contradiction exists and what can be done to address the problem. Your support in 
filling in the questionnaire is kindly appreciated.  
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Main responsibilities of job …………………….
Number of years in present employment ……………………….
Formal education qualifications ……………………………….
Section 2. Integrated Development Plan 
1. How would you describe the process that is followed to develop eThekwini’s IDP? 







(b) Why do you think these steps are followed?
2. How is the content of the IDP influenced by the process in which it is formulated? 
3. What are the outcomes of the IDP relevant to small businesses?
(a) Would you say these outcomes are desirable? Please explain your answer. 
(b) What do you think is the importance of participation and accountability?








5. How would you rank participation and accountability in the municipality’s small 






Section 3: LED and small businesses
6. What do you by understand by Local Economic Development (LED)?
 
7. What would you say is the relationship between LED and IDP?
8. What process are you aware of which was undertaken to develop the LED strategy?
9. Would you say the LED formation process:
(A) was participatory?  
(B) was accountable to public? 
(c) What kind of public?  Further comments?
10. Would you say that LED has produced desirable outcomes? Please explain.
11. What specific area does LED focus when dealing with small businesses? Please 
explain.
 
12. How would you explain the interaction between LED stakeholders and small 
businesses? Please explain.
120
13. What factors do you think influence the interaction you have described above? Why?
14. How would you say the municipality measures its performance when dealing with 
small businesses?
(a) Is this measurement:
(ai) Participatory? Please explain 
(aii) Made public? Please explain
15. What performance measurements would you say small businesses prefer to use? 
16. Would you say the municipality interacts regularly with small businesses with the 
intention to understand their concerns? Please explain
Section 4: Conclusion
17. Would you say the outcomes specified in the IDP: 
(a) Help to improve participation?  Please explain 
(b) Help to improve accountability? Please explain 
18. Small businesses development? Pease explain
19. Would you suggest could be done to improve the content process of LED in dealing 
with small businesses?
20. do you think would enhance: 
(a) Participation by small businesses in LED programmes?
(b) Accountability of LED stakeholders?  
21. Any other comments?    
Thank you so much for your time. 
